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Abstract 
 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) form a promising approach for applications that 
need fast installation with no infrastructure especially in disaster recovery and emergency 
operations. On the other hand, many challenges are facing MANETs including security, 
routing, transmission range, quality of service and dynamically changing topology with 
high nodes mobility. Many research studies have concluded that security is considered the 
main obstacle for the widespread adoption of MANET applications. 
Security is an important challenge because MANETs are vulnerable to various attacks at 
all layers due to their distinguished characteristics. One of the severe attacks is the black 
hole attack. Black hole attack is an active attack that operates in the network layer. It is 
considered as a type of denial of service (DoS) attack that disrupts the services of routing 
layer by exploiting the route discovery process of the routing protocol. According to many 
research studies that focus on studying the effects of malicious attacks on network 
performance, the black hole attack has the worst malicious impact on network performance 
specially when the number of malicious nodes increases. 
Several mechanisms and protocols have been proposed to detect and mitigate the effects of 
the black hole attack using different strategies. However, many of these solutions impose 
more overhead and increase the average end-to-end delay. 
We have proposed "Enhanced RID-AODV" to avoid and mitigate multiple black hole 
attacks. This protocol, which is an enhanced version of a preceding one "RID-AODV" , is 
based on creating dynamic blacklists for each node in the network. Each node, according to 
criteria depends on the number of mismatches of hash values of received packets as 
v 
 
compared with some threshold values, can decide to add or remove other nodes to or from 
its blacklist. The threshold is a function of mobility (variable threshold) to cancel the 
effect of normal link failure. 
"Enhanced RID-AODV" was simulated and compared with other protocols for mitigating 
multiple black hole attacks in terms of performance metrics. The results show an increase 
in throughput and packet delivery ratio and a decrease in end-to-end delay and overhead 
ratio. 
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 تهديدات الثقوب السوداء المتعددة واستبعادها في الشبكات اللاسلكية الآنيةبروتوكول ديناميكي لكشف 
 eloH kcalB elpitluM fo noitagitiM dna noitceteD rof locotorP tneiciffE dna cimanyD
 sTENAM ni skcattA
 عبد الرحمن سالم: إعداد الطالب
 رشدي حمامرة. د: إشراف
 المستخلص
بمزايا فريدة تمنح هذا النوع من  )sTENAM( skrowteN coH dA eliboMالشبكات اللاسلكية الآنية تتميز 
فيها إنشاء شبكات ببنية تحتية وبشكل ) أو يصعب(الشبكات إمكانيات خاصة، تجعلها الحل المناسب في بيئة لا يمكن 
لكن في نفس الوقت، هذه الميزات . لكوارثلذلك تستخدم في عمليات الانقاذ وفي حالات الطوارئ عند حدوث ا. سريع
و بروتوكولات التوجيه  )ytiruceS noitamrofnI(في الشبكات الآنية تضعها أمام تحديات منها أمن المعلومات 
 cimanyD(لحزم البيانات عبر الشبكة، لأن الشبكات الآنية تتشكل بطوبولوجيا ديناميكية   )slocotorP gnituoR(
 .)ygolopoT
أمن المعلومات في هذه الشبكات من أهم التحديات لأن خصائصها تجعلها عرضة للكثير من الخروقات وعرضة يعتبر 
وتشير الدراسات والأبحاث . )sreyaL krowteN(للتهديدات الالكترونية عليها من خلال جميع الطبقات في الشبكة 
 .المعلومات فيها بأن سبب عدم الانتشار الواسع لمثل هذه الشبكات يعود إلى ضعف أمن
 eloH kcalB(التي تهدد أمن الشبكات الآنية، تهديد الثقب الأسود  )kcattA evitcA(ومن أنواع التهديدات النشطة 
 gnituor(، حيث يستحوذ على عملية توجيه حزم البيانات )reyal krowten(الذي يستهدف طبقة الشبكة . )kcattA
وتقوم هذه العقدة بإهمال حزم البيانات التي تصلها بدل  )edoN suoicilaM( لتوجيهها إلى العقدة الخبيثة )stekcap
 iiv
 
 ecivreS fo laineDمن إعادة إرسالها لتصل إلى هدفها المقصود، مما قد يؤدي إلى حجب الخدمة في الشبكة 
 .)sedoN suoicilaM(وتزداد خطورة هذا التهديد بزيادة عدد العقد الخبيثة . )SoD(
لمستخدمة لحل هذه المشكلة  تزيد من عدد حزم البيانات التي تصل إلى هدفها ولكنها في نفس الوقت البروتوكولات ا
-dnE(وأيضًا تزيد في تأخير وصول هذه الحزم  )daehrevO(تفرض اجراءات أخرى تزيد من الأعباء على الشبكة 
 .)yaleD dnE-ot
يقوم بتحسين نقل حزم البيانات من خلال كشف  "VDOA-DIR decnahnE"تم تصميم وتطوير بروتوكول 
من مسار حزم البيانات في الشبكة الآنية، عن طريق إنشاء  )seloH kcalB gnitagitiM(واستبعاد العقد الخبيثة 
 .أوتوماتيكيقوائم ديناميكية للعقد السوداء أي الخبيثة، يتم إضافة أو إزالة العقد في أو من القائمة بشكل 
تفوق في زيادة  – )noitalumis(من خلال المحاكاة  –كول المقترح مقارنة مع البروتوكولات الأخرى أظهر البروتو 
 .oitaR daehrevOو  yaleD dnE-ot-dnEوتقليل  oitaR yrevileD tekcaP، tuphguorhT
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1.1 Introduction: 
Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a self-configuring network formed by co-
operating and independent nodes that connect and communicate with each other wirelessly 
without pre-existing infrastructure. If two mobile nodes are within each other's 
transmission range, they can communicate with each other directly; otherwise, the nodes in 
between have to forward the packet for them. So, mobile nodes are not only functioning as 
hosts but they are also functioning as routers ‎[1]‎[2]. Figure 1.1 shows a mobile ad hoc 
network. 
 
Figure 1.1: Mobile Ad Hoc Network 
Because MANETs are infrastructure-less networks with no centralized 
administration, they can be self deployed in short time. The easy deployment of nodes, 
self-organizing nature and freedom of mobility make MANETs suitable for a broad range 
of applications. They can be useful in disaster recovery and emergency operations where 
there is not enough time or resources to install and configure an infrastructure. They are 
also used in other applications; for example, in military services, maritime 
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communications, vehicle networks, casual meetings, campus networks, robot networks… 
etc ‎[3]. 
On the other hand, MANETs are vulnerable to various attacks at all layers, 
including in particular the network layer, because the design of most MANET routing 
protocols assumes that there is no malicious intruder node in the network ‎[4]. 
This study addresses one of the most severe attacks in MANETs, which is multiple 
black hole attack ‎[5]. We propose an enhanced and modified routing protocol that is able to 
avoid and mitigate the effects that may come due to the existence of multiple malicious 
nodes that are acting as black hole nodes. 
1.2 Overview of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs): 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a network of mobile nodes that are able to 
move arbitrarily and are connected by wireless links. It is a self-configuring network that 
does not require any pre-existent infrastructure such as centralized management or base 
stations. Because the nodes in MANET are free to move, leave, and join the network 
randomly due to mobility; the network topology is changing continuously ‎[1]‎[2]. 
This kind of network has the advantage of being able to be set up and deployed 
quickly because it has a simple infrastructure set-up and no central administration. These 
networks are particularly useful to those mobile users who need to communicate in 
situations where no fixed wired infrastructures are available. However, the salient feature 
of creating a network 'on the fly' without requiring any prearranged infrastructure gave 
mobile ad hoc networks an appreciated interest in both industrial and military systems. The 
key challenges in MANETs design come from the decentralized nature, self-organization, 
self-management, and also the fact that all communications are carried over wireless links 
in short-range communication. In addition to that the topology in the network is 
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dynamically changed because of the high mobility nature in (MANET). Therefore, all 
these unique characteristics present appreciable challenges for MANETs ‎[6]‎[7]. 
In comparison with wired networks where the devices must have physical access to 
the network medium, MANETs have no apparent secure boundary. Besides, whilst devices 
used in wired networks get their electrical supply directly through available power grids, in 
MANET nodes are generally operated by small batteries with a limited lifetime. This 
makes nodes unable to perform intensive computations over prolonged periods of time. 
Also, Mobile ad hoc networks are highly dynamic and large scale, and they cannot be 
easily monitored ‎[8]. 
1.2.1 Characteristics of MANETs: 
MANETs have many characteristics that make them entirely different from other 
wireless and wired networks. Some of the key characteristics of MANETs are discussed 
below ‎[2]‎[6]‎[7]: 
1. Dynamic Topology: 
Nodes in MANETs are free to move arbitrarily; thus, the network topology may 
change randomly and rapidly at unpredictable times. Thus, the nodes can be 
dynamically inside and outside the network, constantly changing their links and 
topology, leading to change in the routing information all the time due to the 
movement of the nodes. Therefore, the communicated links between nodes in 
MANET can be bi-directional or unidirectional. 
2. Infrastructure less:  
MANETs are formed based on the collaboration between autonomous nodes, peer-
to-peer nodes that need to communicate with each other for a special purpose, 
without any base station, central server, or specialized hardware and fixed routers. 
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3. Self-Configuring: 
MANETs have decentralized infrastructure, with all mobile nodes functioning as 
routers and all wireless devices being interconnected to one another. MANETs are 
self-configuring networks in which network activities, including the discovery of 
the topology and delivery of messages, are executed by the nodes themselves. 
4. Fast Deployment: 
The infrastructure-less nature of MANETs, makes the deployment of these 
networks fast and easy. This is the most desirable characteristic of MANETs that 
has made it widely applicable especially in cases where network is needed where 
no infrastructure is available such as in case of emergencies or for personal 
networking in remote areas. 
5. Node Mobility: 
Mobile nodes are autonomous units in network which continuously change their 
position and topology independently. Due to continuous motion of nodes the 
topology changes frequently which means tracking down of particular node 
becomes difficult. The nodes can easily come out of or into the radio range of 
various other nodes. The routing information of nodes changes continuously as 
their movement becomes random. 
6. Multi-hop communications: 
The communication in MANETs between any two remote nodes is performed by 
numerous intermediary nodes whose functions are to relay data-packets from one 
point to another. Thus, ad hoc networks require the support of multi-hop 
communications. 
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7. Shared Physical Medium: 
The wireless communication medium is accessible to any entity with the 
appropriate equipment and adequate resources. Accordingly, access to the channel 
cannot be restricted. 
1.2.2 Limitations of MANETs: 
MANETs have many limitations because of their nature. Main limitations of MANETs are 
described as follows: ‎[6]‎[7]‎[11] 
1. Bandwidth Constraints: 
Mobile ad hoc networks are more susceptible to external noise, interference, fading 
and signal attenuation effects. Therefore, their bandwidth is limited because of the 
significantly low capacity wireless links as compared to fixed networks. 
2. Energy constraints: 
Nodes in MANETs are generally battery-operated.   The power of these small 
batteries is limited resulting in a limited lifetime of the nodes. The nodes may 
behave in a selfish manner because of the limited power supply. 
3. Resources constraints: 
Most MANET devices are small hand-held devices. These devices indeed have 
limitations because of their restricted nature; they are often have small processing 
and storage facilities. 
4. Limited physical security: 
Mobility implies higher security risks such as peer-to-peer network architecture or 
a shared wireless medium accessible by both legitimate network users and 
malicious attackers. Eavesdropping, spoofing and denial-of-service attacks should 
be considered. 
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5. Lack of Centralized Management: 
Nodes in MANETs operate in a distributed manner without any centralized control 
by a network administrator. Lack of centralized control in MAENTs can influence 
several operational aspects of the network. This property leads to the issues of 
organizing and managing these networks. Lack of centralized control makes 
monitoring and detection of attacks a challenging issue. 
1.2.3 Applications of MANETs: 
All nodes in MANETs are mobile and the topology is dynamic. These self-
configuring networks that do not require a fixed infrastructure can be applied anywhere 
where there is no communication infrastructure or installing infrastructure is expensive or 
inconvenient ‎[2]‎[7]. 
The following are the main domains for mobile ad hoc network applications: ‎[2]‎[6]‎[7]‎[9] 
1. Emergency services: 
A mobile ad hoc network is most suitable to provide emergency services 
applications, such as search and rescue operations in disaster recovery, where the 
entire communication infrastructure is destroyed and establishing a network for 
communication quickly is crucial. Using a mobile ad hoc networking technology, 
where a network could be set up in hours instead of weeks. In emergencies caused 
by natural disasters such as earthquakes, fires and floods ad hoc networking 
technology provides a quick and easy way to connect police, firemen, ambulance, 
medical staff and other independent teams to perform rescue operations. 
2. Commercial Applications: 
Possible application scenarios of MANETs in commercial areas include e-banking, 
e-commerce and business applications. For example, Electronic payments from 
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anywhere such as communication dispatch systems for taxi in a town are used to 
inform individual taxis about passenger pickups, route directions, weather 
conditions etc. Although taxi networks has central point from where the 
communications to individual taxis takes place, this communication dispatch 
system of taxis works in an ad hoc manner. 
3. Educational Applications: 
MANETS can be used to setup virtual classrooms or conference rooms. Also, they 
can be used to setup ad hoc communication during conferences, meetings, or 
lectures. 
4. Collaborative Applications: 
For some business environments, the need for collaborative computing might be 
more important outside office environments than inside and where people do need 
to have outside meetings to cooperate and exchange information on a certain given 
project. 
5. Entertainment: 
MANETs help a lot in entertainment, for example, multi-user gaming, robotic pets, 
and theme parks. 
6. Military battlefield: 
MANETs can be used in the military to maintain an information network between 
the soldiers, vehicles and their headquarters. 
7. Personal Area Networking (PAN): 
It is a communication network of personal devices such as computers, personal 
digital assistant (PDAs), telephones and notepads.  These devices can form an ad 
hoc network to communicate and achieve other networking facilities using either 
WLAN or Bluetooth. 
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1.2.4 Security Requirements in MANETs: 
The major security requirements of MANETs are secure linking, secure routing and secure 
data transmission or secure data packet forwarding. The task of providing security in the 
MANET network is a key matter in order to protect the data that are exchanged between 
the nodes. It is necessary to find security solutions for MANET network where security 
services exist. These security services are a fundamental requirement in security solutions 
in MANET network ‎[10]‎[11]‎[12]: 
1. Confidentiality: Confidentiality means that Information access is possible only for 
nodes that have been authorized to access it. Any information or data should never 
be disclosed to any unauthorized parties. 
2. Integrity: Integrity provides protection of message data during transmission. 
Integrity can be compromised mainly in two ways: malicious altering and 
accidental altering. A message can be removed, replayed or revised by an adversary 
with malicious goal, which is regarded as malicious altering. On the other hand, 
accidental altering may happen when the message is lost or its content is changed 
due to some benign failures, which might be transmission errors in communication 
or hardware errors such as hard disk failure. 
3. Availability: A node should maintain its ability to provide all the designed services 
regardless of its security state. This security criterion is challenged mainly during 
the denial-of-service attacks, in which all the nodes in the network can be the attack 
target and thus some selfish nodes make some of the network services unavailable, 
such as the routing protocol or the key management service. 
4. Non-repudiation: Non repudiation ensures that the sender and the receiver of a 
message cannot deny that they have ever sent or received such a message. This is 
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useful especially when it's needed to discriminate if a node with some abnormal 
behavior is compromised or not. 
5. Authentication: Authentication is an essential assurance that participants in 
communication are genuine and not impersonators. It is necessary for the 
communication participants to prove their identities as what they have claimed 
using some techniques so as to ensure the authenticity. If there is not such an 
authentication mechanism, the adversary could impersonate a benign node and thus 
get access to confidential resources, or even propagate some fake messages to 
disturb the normal network operations. 
6. Authorization: Authorization is a mechanism for defining the powers to gain 
access to certain resources, that is, control over how to access the network. 
Authorization is generally used to assign different access rights to different levels 
of users. For instance, we need to ensure that network management function is only 
accessible by the network administrator. Therefore, there should be an 
authorization process before the network administrator accesses the network 
management functions. 
7. Anonymity: Anonymity means that all the personal information that can be used to 
identify the owner or the current user of the node should by default be kept private 
and not to be distributed by the node itself or the system software. This criterion is 
closely related to privacy preserving, in which we should try to protect the privacy 
of the nodes from arbitrary disclosure to any other entities. 
1.2.5 MANETs Vulnerabilities: 
Vulnerability is a weakness in security system. MANETs suffer from all the vulnerabilities 
that their wired counterparts encountered. Some of these vulnerabilities are aggravated in a 
wireless context due to the characteristics of MANETs, such as the lack of a clear line of 
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defense and the in-the-air communications. Besides, ad hoc networks are susceptible to 
vulnerabilities that are inherent to wireless networks, which reside in their routing and 
auto-configuration mechanisms ‎[13]. 
Some of the vulnerabilities on ad hoc networks are ‎[11]‎[14]: 
1. Lack of centralized management: The absence of centralized management in 
MANETs makes the detection of attacks difficult; because it is not easy to monitor 
the traffic in a highly dynamic and large scale ad hoc network. 
2. Resource availability: Resource availability is a major issue in MANET. 
Providing secure communication in such changing environment as well as 
protection against specific threats and attacks, leads to development of various 
security schemes and architectures. Collaborative ad hoc environments also allow 
implementation of self-organized security mechanism. 
3. Scalability: Due to mobility of nodes, scale of ad hoc network is changing all the 
time. So, scalability is a major issue concerning security. Security mechanism 
should be capable of handling large networks as well as small ones. 
4. Cooperativeness: Routing algorithm for MANETs usually assumes that nodes are 
cooperative and non-malicious. As a result a malicious attacker can easily become 
an important routing agent and disrupt network operation by disobeying the 
protocol specifications. 
5. Dynamic topology: Dynamic topology and changeable nodes membership may 
disturb the trust relationship among nodes. The trust may also be disturbed if some 
nodes are detected as compromised. This dynamic behavior could be better 
protected with distributed and adaptive security mechanisms. 
6. Limited power supply: The nodes in mobile ad hoc networks need to consider 
restricted power supply, which will cause several problems. A node in a mobile ad 
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hoc network may behave in a selfish manner when it is finding that there is only 
limited power supply. 
7. Bandwidth constraint: Variable low capacity links exist as compared to wireless 
networks which are more susceptible to external noise, interference and signal 
attenuation effects. 
8. Adversary inside the Network: The mobile nodes within the MANET can freely 
join and leave the network. The nodes within network may also behave 
maliciously. This is hard to detect that the behavior of the node is malicious. Thus, 
this attack is more dangerous than the external attack. Those nodes are called 
compromised nodes. 
9. No predefined Boundary: In mobile ad- hoc networks, a physical boundary of the 
network cannot be precisely defined. The nodes work in a nomadic environment 
where they are allowed to join and leave the wireless network. As soon as an 
adversary comes in the radio range of a node it will be able to communicate with 
that node. 
10. Wireless Links: As the nodes in such networks are interconnected through 
wireless interface that makes it highly susceptible to link attacks. The bandwidths 
of wireless networks are less as compared to wired networks, which attracts many 
attackers to prevent normal communication among nodes. 
1.2.6 Security Challenges in MANETs: 
The unique characteristics of MANETs, such as absence of infrastructure, rapid and 
unpredictable change of topology, open and shared wireless medium, and stringent 
resource constraints, have posed nontrivial challenges to security designs. Table 1.1 
summarizes those challenges ‎[13]: 
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Table 1.1: Security Challenges in MANETs 
Characteristics Security Challenges 
Open shared medium Makes an ad hoc network susceptible to attacks such as 
eavesdropping, signal jamming, impersonation, 
message distortion and message injection. 
Absence of infrastructure and 
frequent change of topology 
and membership 
Raises the probability of a network to be compromised. 
MANETs don't have dedicated routers to form a clear 
line of defense where traffic monitoring or access 
control mechanisms can be deployed. In addition, each 
mobile node is functioning as a router and participating 
in routing and packet forwarding processes; so, a 
malicious node en route can tamper the routing and 
data packets. 
Constraints of resources (such 
as power, bandwidth, CPU 
capacity and memory) 
Security mechanisms must be lightweight in terms of 
communication overhead, computation complexity and 
storage overhead. Asymmetric cryptography is usually 
considered too expensive for MANETs. Therefore, 
symmetric cryptographic algorithms and one-way 
functions are commonly used to protect data integrity 
and confidentiality. 
An ad hoc network may consist 
of a great number of nodes 
Renders scalability 
 
The security mechanisms or approaches should be adapted to the characteristics of 
MANETs. The security solutions for MANETs should accommodate the following needs 
‎[15]‎[16]: 
1. The security solution should spread across many individual components and rely on 
their collective protection power to secure the entire network. The security scheme 
adopted by each device has to work within its own resource limitations in terms of 
computation capability, memory, communication capacity and energy supply. 
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2. The security solution should span different layers of the protocol stack, with each 
layer contributing to a line of defense. No single-layer solution is possible to thwart 
all potential attacks. 
3. The security solution should thwart threats from both outsiders who launch attacks 
on the wireless channel and network topology, and insiders who sneak into the 
system through compromised devices and gain access to certain system knowledge. 
4. The security solution should encompass all three components of prevention, 
detection and reaction, that work in concert to guard the system from collapse. 
5. The security solution should be practical and affordable in a highly dynamic and 
resource constrained networking scenario. 
1.3 Research Methodology: 
This research depends on studying previous work and examining the existing used 
mechanisms by checking their effectiveness in mitigating the effects of the malicious 
nodes and in preventing the denial of service by checking the performance metrics. Then, 
the proposed protocol was implemented and developed to be tested and compared with 
other protocols with the similar purposes. 
In this research, we adopted the ns-2 simulator because it is considered in many research 
studies in the field; it is an open source simulator and does not require any licenses. 
1.4 Motivation: 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) have special characteristics that make them 
distinguished from other wireless and wired networks. These characteristics make 
MANETs a promising technology in a wide range of applications in many domains. 
However, in the same time, these characteristics also make MANETs vulnerable to several 
attacks making security a major challenge in MANETs. Researcher found that security is 
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the main obstacle for the widespread adoption of MANET applications as in ‎[4]‎[17]‎[18]. 
One of the severe attacks in MANETs is the black hole attack which is an active attack that 
operates in the network layer. This attack becomes more severe when multiple nodes in the 
network are acting together as black hole nodes. 
In multiple black hole attacks, the malicious nodes provide fresh routes that make 
other legitimate nodes use these malicious nodes in their routes, and then they drop the 
legitimate traffic of the network resulting in a very low throughput and packet delivery 
ratio. 
Many Several mechanisms and protocols have been proposed to detect and mitigate 
its effect using different strategies. However, many of these solutions impose more 
overhead and increase the average end-to-end delay. 
This motivates us to try to provide a solution to multiple black hole attacks in 
MANET. In this study, we propose an enhanced and modified routing protocol that is 
dynamic and able to avoid these multiple malicious nodes and mitigate its effects. This 
dynamic and efficient protocol provides not only an increase in throughput and packet 
delivery ratio but also a decrease in end-to-end delay and overhead ratio, which are very 
important performance metrics in MANETs. 
1.5 Black Hole Threat Model: 
The black hole attack is considered as: 
 Active attack: it has modification and dropping behavior. 
 Operates in the network layer. 
 Interrupts the route discovery process. 
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 Kind of denial of service attack where it will disrupt the network and the result 
affects the whole performance of the network. 
The attack is made by malicious node which attacks the control message of the routing 
protocols such as AODV. The diagram in Figure 1.2 is the attack model on how the 
malicious node M pretends to be a node with attractive route to the destination node D. 
Upon receiving the RREQ message from node 3, node M immediately generates RREP 
message and sends it to source node S. In large networks, there is a possibility to have 
more than one reply of RREP massage. 
In order to be favoured against others, the destination sequence number sent by node M 
is normally higher and it is sent ahead of the rest. Characteristic of AODV will make node 
S to believe that the first RREP received (through node 3) is the shortest and most up-to-
date path to destination node D. As a result, node S updates its routing table by taking node 
3 as its next hop to send out data to node D. Node 3 with infected route entry forwards the 
data packet to node M. Node M either keeps or drops the packet without forwarding it to 
the destination node D as if the packet is disappeared in a black hole as the attack name 
implies. 
 
Figure 1.2: Black Hole Attack Model in AODV 
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1.6 Problem Statement: 
 
The participating nodes of MANETs are independent, mobile and don't have a 
centralized and organized network infrastructure. Hence, nodes act as routers and are free 
to move randomly; thus, the network topology changes rapidly and unpredictably. 
Therefore, MANETs use a peer-to-peer multi-hop routing instead of a static network 
infrastructure to provide network connectivity. 
Routing protocols in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks by their nature are distributed 
routing protocols with the assumption that all nodes in the network will cooperate truly and 
participate honestly. However, the existence of malicious nodes makes this assumption 
untrue. Such nodes may drop the packets, if they are not the destination, without 
forwarding them or may disrupt the routing discovery and maintenance processes resulting 
in abnormal network operation that affects the performance of the network and may cause 
denial of service ‎[5]. 
A black hole attack is a kind of denial of service where a malicious node can attract 
all packets by falsely claiming a fresh route to the destination and then absorb them (drop 
all packets) without forwarding them to the destination ‎[19]. 
In reactive routing protocols such as AODV, the destination sequence number 
(dest_seq) is used to describe the freshness of the route. A higher value of dest_seq means 
a fresher route. On receiving a RREQ, an intruder can advertise itself as having the fresher 
route by sending a Route Reply (RREP) packet with a new dest_seq number larger than the 
current dest_seq number. In this way the intruder becomes part of the route to that 
destination ‎[20]. 
The problem of a black hole has two properties: First, the node exploits the ad hoc 
routing protocol to advertise itself as having a valid route to a destination, even though the 
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route is spurious with the intention of intercepting packets. Second, the node consumes the 
intercepted packets; a black hole node absorbs the network traffic and drops all packets. 
As a result, the black hole attack has a severe impact in decreasing the network 
throughput and packet delivery ratio. Besides, the existence of multiple black hole nodes 
increases the severity of this attack resulting in a denial of service problem. 
1.7 Research Objectives: 
The objective of this thesis is to provide security for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). 
There are two main security needs in MANETs: First is to protect the data transmission 
and second to make the routing protocol secure. The second one may be not an issue in the 
centralized networks; but in MANETs, this issue arises because the nodes are not only 
hosts but also routers. In this research, we are focusing on making routing protocols more 
secure to prevent malicious nodes from disrupting the routing process and dropping the 
packets resulting in denial of service (DoS) attack. 
1.8 Research Hypothesis: 
 In this research, we assume that the intermediate nodes are moving randomly and 
sending packets among them randomly too. 
 Malicious nodes (the black hole nodes) are part of the intermediate nodes that were 
compromised with malicious software making them to behave abnormally but they 
carry out the black hole tasks. 
 Any intermediate node in the MANET can be a black hole node. 
 The normal nodes are using the Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
routing protocol. 
 AODV was adopted in this research because of several reasons: 
19 
 
o It is a reactive (on-demand) routing protocol. AODV doesn't maintain 
network topology at each node and no periodic route updates like proactive 
routing protocols. However, It finds route whenever needed. 
o It is table-based routing not a source-based like DSR, in which each packet 
carries the complete routing information for its destination in its header. 
o AODV is robust since it uses flooding for route discovery; thus, it does not 
require mobility to be synchronized ‎[21]. 
1.9 Thesis Contributions: 
Information security is one of the most important challenges in MANETs, especially 
securing the routing processes; because the nodes themselves are responsible for routing 
and forwarding data packets traversing across the network. Malicious nodes can misroute 
or drop packets to decrease the performance of the network and increase the delay in 
delivering these packets, resulting in a denial of service. We have done the following: 
 We have designed and developed an enhanced protocol "Enhanced RID-AODV" 
that is able to detect and mitigate multiple malicious nodes that are acting as black 
hole nodes in MANETs. 
 We have designed and developed a dynamic mechanism to automatically blacklist 
or delist malicious nodes with threshold as function of mobility (variable 
threshold) to cancel the effect of normal link failure (which is not a malicious 
behavior). 
 "Enhanced RID-AODV" also provides a full path (bi-directional) integrity check 
for the routing control packets. 
 "Enhanced RID-AODV" is lightweight because it maintains only a limited number 
of counters and requires minimum processing requirements. 
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 We verified the performance of "Enhanced RID-AODV" by simulation and 
comparing with RID-AODV, RAODV, IDSAODV and AODV. 
1.10 Literature Review: 
Some research studies in the literature have focused on studying the effect of 
malicious nodes on network performance only without providing any solutions. However, 
several mechanisms and protocols using different strategies have been proposed to protect 
MANETs against black hole attacks. Ashok Kanthe et al. studied the effect of malicious 
attacks in mobile ad hoc networks including black hole attack, packet drop attack and gray 
hole attack on AODV protocol under different performance metrics: throughput, packet 
drop rate and end-to-end delay. It was found that the black hole attack is more dangerous 
than other attacks mentioned in this paper ‎[22]. 
Imad Aad et al. provided a quantitative study of the performance impact and 
scalability of DoS attacks in ad hoc networks. They have also considered the black hole 
attack, as its impact in ad hoc networks. The authors considered the following as critical 
performance measures for a system under attack: total system throughput and probability 
of interception in addition to the system fairness measures and the mean number of hops 
for a received packet. The simulation results for the impact of black hole node showed that 
the system has high fairness index with no black hole in the network ‎[23]. 
Dinesh Mishra et al. analyzed the effects of black hole attack in mobile ad hoc 
network using AODV and DSR routing protocols. The authors considered the throughput 
as the main performance measure. Simulation results, by NS-2 simulator, showed that a 
higher data packet loss when using DSR as compared to AODV. The observation and 
results showed that DSR data loss is around 55%- 60% in the presence of black hole 
attack, while 45%-50% in the AODV routing. AODV protocol provides better 
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performance than the DSR in the presence of black holes with minimal additional delay 
and overhead ‎[24]. 
Elmar Gerhards-Padilla et al present a novel centralized intrusion detection 
approach for detecting routing attacks in tactical MANETs called Topology Graph based 
Anomaly Detection (TOGBAD). It was developed against the Optimized Link State 
Routing protocol (OLSR) protocol. Firstly, a topology graph is created and the number of 
neighbors of a node according to this topology graph is calculated. Secondly, the number 
of neighbors a node claims to have in its HELLO messages is determined. Finally, the 
originator’s number of neighbors according to the message is checked for plausibility 
against the number of neighbors according to the topology graph. A significant difference 
between the two values triggers an alarm. With this approach, it is possible to detect the 
attempt to create a black hole before the actual impact occurs ‎[25]. 
Sonja Buchegger and Jean-Yves Le Boudec proposed a robust reputation system 
for misbehaviour detection in mobile ad hoc networks. Nodes have a monitor for 
observations, reputation records for first-hand and trusted second-hand observations about 
routing and forwarding behaviour of other nodes, trust records to control trust given to 
received warnings, and a path manager to adapt their behaviour according to reputation and 
to take action against misbehaved nodes. Nodes monitor their neighbours and change the 
reputation accordingly. When the reputation rating is bad, they take action in routing and 
forwarding. The routes containing the misbehaved node are either reranked or deleted from 
the path cache. In addition, once a node has detected a misbehaved node, it informs other 
nodes by sending an ALARM message ‎[26]. 
Hongmei Deng et al. proposed a method to solve the black hole problem. This 
method is to disable the ability of an intermediate node to reply in a RREP message, so all 
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reply messages should be sent out only by the destination node. This method increases the 
routing delay, especially for a large network. Besides, a malicious node can take advantage 
by fabricating a reply message claiming it was sent from the destination node. Another 
solution was proposed in this paper that depends on using one more route to the 
intermediate node that replays the RREQ message to check whether the route from the 
intermediate node to the destination node exists or not. If it's not exists, the reply message 
from the intermediate node is discarded and an alarm message to the network is sent out. 
Using this method, the black hole problem was avoided, and further malicious behavior 
was also prevented. This method can't prevent multiple black hole attacks ‎[27]. 
Seungjoon Lee et al. proposed a method to avoid Black Hole attack based on 
introducing additional route confirmation messages: Route Confirmation Request (CREQ) 
and Route Confirmation Reply (CREP). In the proposed method, the intermediate node 
requests its next hop to send a confirmation message to the source. After receiving both 
route reply and confirmation message, the source determines the validity of path according 
to its policy. Simulation results show remarkable improvement in 30% higher delivery 
ratio. Its drawback is that it can't detect multiple Black Hole attacks and the control 
messages have been increased ‎[28]. 
Satoshi Kurosawa et al. proposed an anomaly detection scheme for black hole 
nodes using dynamic training method in which the training data is updated at regular time 
intervals. The considered the destination sequence number in order to detect this attack. In 
normal state, sequence number changes depending on its traffic conditions and the 
destination sequence number tends to rise monotonically when the number of connections 
increases. However, during the attack, the sequence number is increased largely. A 
statistical method is applied for detection of black hole that is based on the difference 
between destination sequence numbers of received RREPs. The simulation results of this 
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method showed significant effectiveness in detecting the black hole attack as compared 
with conventional scheme. Through the simulation, our method shows significant 
effectiveness in detecting the black hole attack ‎[20]. 
The solution proposed by Arun Raj Kumar and S. Selvakumar, focuses on the 
requirement of a source node to wait unless there is arrival of RREP packet from more than 
two nodes. When it receives multiple RREPs the source node checks that there is any share 
hops or not. The source node will consider the route safe if it finds the share hops. Its 
drawback is the introduction of time delay it has to wait for the arrival of multiple RREPs 
before it judges the authentication of node ‎[29]. 
Durgesh Wadbude and Vineet Richariya proposed an approach that uses improved 
security mechanisms to be introduced in the proposed techniques so that it satisfies the 
main security requirement and guarantees the discovery of a correct and secure route. The 
security mechanisms that the protocol uses are the hash chain, digital signature and 
Protocol Enforcement Mechanism. The performance of these two protocols (SAODV and 
ARAN) was tested in simulation and their communication costs were measured using the 
ns-2 simulator, which is suitable for the present purpose. The evaluation metrics used in 
this study were overhead and end-to-end delay. The results show good performance ‎[30]. 
Lalit Himral et al. introduced a method to find the secured routes and prevent the 
malicious nodes (black hole nodes) in the MANETs by checking whether there is a large 
difference between the sequence number of source node or intermediate node that has sent 
back first RREP or not. Generally, the first route reply will be from the malicious node 
with high destination sequence number, which is stored as the first entry in the Route 
Reply Table (RR-Table). Then compare the first destination sequence number with the 
source node sequence number, if there exists much more differences between them, then it 
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is surely from the malicious node, immediately removes that entry from the RR-Table. The 
proposed method cannot find multiple black hole nodes ‎[31]. 
Elhadi Shakshuki et al. proposed and implemented a new intrusion detection 
system named Enhanced Adaptive Acknowledgment (EAACK) specially designed for 
MANETs. Compared to modern approaches, EAACK demonstrates privileged malicious 
behavior detection rates in definite situations while it does not greatly affect the network 
performances. The demonstrated results show positive performances ‎[32]. 
A lightweight routing protocol IDSAODV was proposed by S. Dokurer et al. in 
‎[33] as a solution for black hole attack problem in MANETs.  The authors manually 
analyzed the output file obtained from simulation and found out very soon after the first 
RREP from the destination node a second RREP arrived at the source node. Through 
simulation, they found out that the first RREP was from the black hole node and the 
second RREP was from the intended destination. At this point, for future simulations, they 
assumed that the first RREP would always be from black hole node and modified the 
AODV protocol to ignore the first RREP and send using second RREP route. A RREP 
caching mechanism to count the second RREP message was added to aodv.cc file in NS-2 
‎[33]. 
The simulation results demonstrate that IDSAODV improved the PDR in a 
MANET with a single black hole node; thus, proving the successful implementation of the 
route caching mechanism ‎[33]. 
Many of the proposed solutions that make the route establishment process longer 
while the nodes are moving are facing from the link failure problem. Om Shree and Francis 
Ogwu in ‎[34] addressed this issue by getting advantage of the reverse AODV (RAODV) 
routing protocol proposed by Chonggun Kim et al. in ‎[35]. RAODV discovers route using 
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reverse route discovery procedure where the destination node sends reverse-route request 
(R-RREQ) messages to its neighbors to find a valid route to the source node after receiving 
RREQ from source node. Their simulation results of RAODV show that it does improve 
the performance of AODV in metrics such as packet delivery ratio (PDR), end-to-end 
delay, and energy consumption ‎[34]‎[35]. 
Although RAODV has not been designed to prevent black hole attacks and it was 
developed with the aim of solving path failure problem, Om Shree and Francis Ogwu 
proposed in ‎[34] to use it in mitigating the effects of black hole attacks in ad hoc networks. 
Therefore, they proposed RID-AODV protocol that combines RAODV (proposed in ‎[35]) 
and IDSAODV (proposed in ‎[33]) to withstand multiple black hole attacks in client-based 
WMNs ‎[34]. 
1.11 Thesis Organization: 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: 
This thesis addresses a network layer attack that exploits the routing discovery 
process. Hence, in chapter 2 routing protocols in MANETs are discussed in details. This 
includes the classifications of the routing protocols in MANETs. In addition to description 
of the main protocols and a performance comparison is provided in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 is about security attacks in MANETs. It provides classification of 
security attacks and classification of security attackers in MANETs. A special section in 
this chapter has been added to address the black hole attack in details and to provide a 
behavioural analysis of this attack. 
In chapter 4, we present the proposed protocol (Enhanced RID-AODV). It is an 
enhanced version of a preceding one, so we provide how we got advantages from that 
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preceding protocol and what are the enhancements in this protocol. The chapter ends with 
pseudocodes for the proposed protocol. 
Chapter 5 is about the simulation and results. It starts with introducing the used 
simulation tools in this research and a description of the network environment considered 
for simulation. Then the performance metrics that were considered in this research are 
provided. After that, the results of the simulation for all scenarios are provided and 
finishing with analysis of these results. 
Chapter 6 provides the conclusion of this thesis and suggests future work in the 
same field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Chapter Two 
Routing Protocols in MANETs 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Classifications of Routing Protocols in MANETs 
 2.2.1 Proactive Routing Protocols 
 2.2.2 Reactive Routing Protocols 
 2.2.3 Hybrid Routing Protocols 
 2.2.4 Hierarchical Routing Protocol 
 2.2.5 Geographical Routing Protocols 
2.3 Main Routing Protocols in MANETs 
 2.3.1 Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing (DSDV) 
 2.3.2 Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) 
 2.3.3 Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
 2.3.4 Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
 2.3.5 Dynamic MANET On-demand (DYMO) 
2.4 Performance Comparison of Routing Protocols in MANETs 
2.5 Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
Wireless networking paradigms can be classified into two classes: wireless ad hoc and 
cellular networking according to their dependence on fixed infrastructures. In an 
infrastructure mobile network, mobile nodes have wired access points (or base stations) 
within their transmission range. The access points compose the backbone for an 
infrastructure network. In contrast, in the ad hoc networking paradigm there is no fixed 
infrastructure and packets are delivered to their destinations through wireless multi-hop 
connectivity. In a mobile ad hoc network, nodes move arbitrarily; therefore, the network 
topology changes unpredictably. Every node in mobile ad hoc networks has the 
responsibility to act not only as hosts but also as routers. ‎[37]‎[60]. 
Routing protocols for wired networks assume stable topology and link state; this makes 
them not suitable for MANETs. Therefore, research efforts have been made to develop 
efficient routing protocols for MANETs ‎[43]. 
The following section addresses the routing protocols and their classifications. Then a 
comparison between these routing protocols is discussed. 
2.2 Classifications of Routing Protocols in MANETs: 
Appropriate Classification methods for routing protocols are required to help researchers 
and designers to study, compare and analyze mobile ad hoc routing protocols in order to 
understand distinct characteristics of a routing protocol and find its relationship with 
others. These characteristics mainly are related to the information exploited for routing, 
when this information is acquired, and the roles that nodes may take in the routing process 
‎[36]. 
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There are several methods to distinguish mobile ad hoc network routing protocols in order 
to classify them. One of the most popular methods of them is based on how routing 
information is acquired and maintained by mobile nodes. Using this method, mobile ad hoc 
network routing protocols can be divided into proactive routing, reactive routing, and 
hybrid routing. 
Another classification method is based on the roles which nodes may have in a routing 
scheme. In a uniform routing protocol, where the network structure is flat, all mobile nodes 
have the same role, importance, and functionality. However, in nonuniform routing 
protocols, some nodes carry out some management or routing functions. Normally, 
distributed algorithms are exploited to select those special nodes. Nonuniform routing 
approaches are related to hierarchical network structures to facilitate node organization 
and management. 
According to the abovementioned methods that distinguish routing protocols in MANETS, 
figure 2.1 shows the classification of the routing protocols according to network structure 
in MANETs ‎[38]‎[39]‎[40]. 
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Figure 2.1: Classification of the routing protocols in MANETs 
 
2.2.1 Proactive Routing Protocols: 
Proactive routing protocols are also known as table driven routing protocols. They are 
conventional routing protocols based on either link-state or distance vector principles. In 
this routing protocol every node maintains complete information about the network 
topology. Whenever the network topology changes the routing table is updated 
automatically. Periodic route updates are exchanged in order to synchronize the tables. 
Thus, when there is a need for a route to a destination, such route information is available 
immediately. As they need to keep node entries for each and every node in the routing 
table of every node therefore these protocols are not appropriate for usage in large 
networks. Proactive routing protocols maintain different number of routing tables varying 
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from protocol to protocol. Some popular proactive routing protocols are: DSDV, GSR, 
OLSR, WRP etc ‎[39]‎[41]. 
2.2.2 Reactive Routing Protocols: 
Reactive Routing Protocols are also known as on-demand routing protocols. The major 
goal of reactive routing protocols is to minimize the network traffic overhead. These 
protocols are based on Query-Reply topology in which they do not attempt to continuously 
maintain the up-to-date topology of the network. When a route is desired, a procedure is 
invoked to find a route to the destination node by initiating route discovery process. The 
route request packets are flooded by using flooding technique throughout the network for 
route discovery. These protocols require a route discovery and route maintenance process 
‎[39]‎[42]. 
The common element in reactive protocols is the mechanism used for discovering routes. 
The source node emits a request message, requesting a route to the destination node. This 
message is flooded, i.e. relayed by all nodes in the network, until it reaches the destination. 
The path followed by the request message is recorded in the message, and returned to the 
sender by the destination, or by intermediate nodes with sufficient topological information, 
in a reply message. Thus multiple reply messages may result, yielding multiple paths of 
which the shortest is to be used ‎[41]. 
2.2.3 Hybrid Routing Protocols: 
Hybrid routing protocols are protocols that are both proactive and reactive in nature. These 
protocols are designed to increase scalability by allowing nodes with close proximity to 
work together to form some sort of a backbone to reduce the route discovery overheads. In 
hybrid routing protocols, a proactive method is employed to maintain routes for nearby 
nodes; a reactive or route discovery method is used for faraway nodes. Most hybrid 
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protocols are zone based, which means that the network is partitioned or seen as a number 
of zones by each node ‎[36]. 
2.2.4 Hierarchical Routing Protocol: 
Hierarchical Routing is multilevel clustering of mobile nodes. Routing protocols for 
mobile ad hoc networks utilize hierarchical network architectures. The proper proactive 
routing and reactive routing approach are dominated in different hierarchical levels. In case 
of a route failure the entire route does not need to be recalculated. These networks address 
the scalability ‎[39]. 
The most popular way of building hierarchy is to group nodes that are close to each other 
into explicit clusters. Each cluster has a leading node (clusterhead) to communicate to 
other nodes on behalf of the cluster. An alternate way is to have implicit hierarchy. In this 
way, each node has a local scope. Different routing strategies are used inside and outside 
the scope. More efficient overall routing performance can be achieved through this 
flexibility ‎[40]. 
2.2.5 Geographical Routing Protocols: 
The availability of global positioning system (GPS) or similar locating systems allows 
mobile nodes to access geographical information easily. During forwarding operations, 
geographical Routing Protocols (also known as location-aware routing protocols) use the 
nodes position provided by GPS systems or other mechanisms. In location-based routing 
protocols, the distance between a packet forwarding node and the destination, along with 
the node mobility, can be used in both route discovery and packet forwarding. Specifically, 
a node selects the next hop for packets forwarding by using the physical position of its one-
hop neighbours and the physical position of the destination node ‎[36]‎[42]. 
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2.3 Main Routing Protocols in MANETs: 
In this section, we discuss the main and common used routing protocols in MANETs. It 
includes the following protocols: Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing 
(DSDV), Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR), Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance 
Vector (AODV), Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and Dynamic MANET On-demand 
(DYMO). 
2.3.1 Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing (DSDV): 
The DSDV protocol is a table driven algorithm. In routing tables of DSDV, an entry stores 
the next hop toward a destination, the cost metric for the routing path to the destination, 
and a destination sequence number that is created by the destination. Sequence numbers 
are used in DSDV to distinguish stale routes from fresh ones and avoid the formation of 
route loops ‎[36]‎[38]. 
The route updates of DSDV can be either time driven or event driven. In order to keep the 
routing table completely updated at all the time each device periodically broadcasts routing 
message to its neighbor devices. When a neighbor device receives the broadcasted routing 
message and knows the current link cost to the device, it compares this value and the 
corresponding value stored in its routing table. If changes were found, it updates the value 
and re-computes the distance of the route which includes this link in the routing table. On 
the other hand, when a significant change occurs from the last update, a node can transmit 
its changed routing table in an event-triggered style ‎[36]‎[41]. 
Advantages of DSDV: 
 DSDV is an efficient protocol for route discovery. 
 Route discovery latency is very low. 
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 Loop-free paths are guaranteed in DSDV. 
Disadvantages of DSDV: 
 To maintain network topology at each node, DSDV needs to send a lot of control 
messages. 
 DSDV generates a high volume of traffic for high-density and highly mobile 
networks. 
2.3.2 Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR): 
Optimized Link State Protocol is a point-to-point table-driven, proactive protocol 
developed for mobile ad hoc networks, that is, it exchanges topology information with 
other nodes of the network regularly. OLSR employs an efficient link state packet 
forwarding mechanism called multipoint relaying. It optimizes the pure link state routing 
protocol. Each node maintains the topology information about the network by periodically 
exchanging link-state messages among the other nodes. Each node selects a set of its 
neighbor nodes as "multipoint relays" (MPR). A node selects MPRs from among its one-
hop neighbors with "symmetrical" (i.e., bidirectional) linkages. Therefore, selecting the 
route through MPRs automatically avoids the problems associated with data packet 
transfer over unidirectional links. In OLSR, only nodes, selected as such MPRs, are 
responsible for forwarding control traffic, intended for diffusion into the entire network. 
MPRs provide an efficient mechanism for flooding control traffic by reducing the number 
of transmissions required ‎[36]‎[41]. 
Optimizations in OLSR are done in two ways: 
 By reducing the size of the control packets. 
 Reducing the number of links used for forwarding the link state packets ‎[41]. 
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Advantages of OLSR: 
 OLSR makes routes immediately available when needed due to its proactive nature. 
 Best suitable for high density network and does not allows long delays in the 
transmission of the packets. 
Disadvantages of OLSR: 
 OLSR needs more time rediscovering a broken link. 
 OLSR needs that each node periodically sends the updated topology information 
throughout the entire network, this increase the protocols bandwidth usage. But the 
flooding is minimized by the MPR’s. 
2.3.3 Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV): 
Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) is a reactive routing protocol which initiates 
a route discovery process only when it has data packets to transmit and it does not have 
any route path towards the destination node, that is, route discovery in AODV is called as 
on-demand ‎[44]‎[45]. 
AODV routing protocol is intended for use by mobile nodes in an ad hoc network. It offers 
quick adaptation to dynamic link conditions, low processing and memory overhead, low 
network utilization, and determines unicast routes to destinations within the ad hoc 
network.  It uses destination sequence numbers to ensure loop freedom at all times (even in 
the face of anomalous delivery of routing control messages), avoiding problems (such as 
"counting to infinity") associated with classical distance vector protocols ‎[46]. 
The protocol consists of two phases: Route Discovery and Route Maintenance. AODV 
nodes can send four types of messages to communicate among each other. Route Request 
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(RREQ) and Route Reply (RREP) messages are used for route discovery. Route Error 
(RERR) messages and HELLO messages are used for route maintenance ‎[47]. 
 
A. Route Discovery in AODV: 
AODV discovers routes as needed basis via a similar route discovery process. AODV 
relies on routing table entries to propagate an RREP back to the source and, subsequently, 
to route data packets to the destination. AODV uses sequence numbers maintained at each 
destination to determine freshness of routing information and to prevent routing loops. All 
routing packets carry these sequence numbers ‎[45]. 
Whenever a packet is to be sent by a node, it first checks with its routing table to determine 
whether a route to the destination is already available. If so, it uses that route to send the 
packets to the destination. If a route is not available or the previously entered route is 
inactivated, then the node initiates a route discovery process. A RREQ (Route Request) 
packet is broadcasted by the node. Every node that receives the RREQ packet first checks 
whether it is the destination for that packet and if so, it sends back an RREP (Route Reply) 
packet. The route discovery process is shown in figure 2.2 below ‎[48]. 
 
Figure 2.2: AODV route discovery process. (a) Propagation of the RREQ (b) Path of the RREP to the source 
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The RREQ contains the following fields: 
<source_addr, source sequence#, broadcast id, dest_addr, dest sequence#, hop cnt> 
The pair <source_addr, broadcast_id> uniquely identifies an RREQ. broadcast_id is 
incremented whenever the source issues a new RREQ. Each neighbor either satisfies the 
RREQ by sending a Route REPly (RREP) back to the source, or broadcasts the RREQ to 
its own neighbors after increasing the hop_cnt. Notice that a node may receive multiple 
copies of the same route broadcast packet from various neighbors. When an intermediate 
node receives an RREQ, if it has already received an RREQ with the same broadcast_id 
and source address, it drops the redundant RREQ and does not rebroadcast it ‎[36]. 
B. Route Maintenance in AODV: 
The second phase of the protocol is called route maintenance. It is performed by the source 
node and can be subdivided into: i) source node moves: source node initiates a new route 
discovery process, ii) destination or an intermediate node moves: a route error message 
(RERR) is sent to the source node. Intermediate nodes receiving a RERR update their 
routing table by setting the distance of the destination to infinity. If the source node 
receives a RERR it will initiate a new route discovery. To prevent global broadcast 
messages AODV introduces a local connectivity management. This is done by periodical 
exchanges of so called HELLO messages which are small RREP packets containing a 
node's address and additional information ‎[47]. Route maintenance process is shown in 
figure 2.3 below ‎[45]. 
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Figure 2.3: AODV route maintenance process 
Advantages of AODV: 
 AODV is adaptable to dynamic networks 
 AODV creates routes only on demand, which greatly reduces the periodic control 
message overhead associated with proactive routing protocols. 
 AODV is a loop free protocol and avoids the counting-to-infinity problem 
Disadvantages of AODV: 
 There is route setup latency when a new route is needed. 
2.3.4 Dynamic Source Routing (DSR): 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) is an Ad Hoc routing protocol based on the theory of 
source-based routing rather than table-based. This protocol uses source routing in which 
each packet carries the complete routing information for its destination in its header. This 
protocol is source initiated. This is particularly designed for use in multi hop wireless ad 
hoc networks of mobile nodes. Basically, DSR protocol does not need any existing 
network infrastructure or administration. This allows the network to be completely self-
organizing and self-configuring ‎[49]‎[54]. 
This protocol is composed of two essential parts of route discovery and route maintenance. 
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A. Route Discovery in DSR: 
During the route discovery mechanism the DSR accumulate the address of each device 
coming between the source and the destination. The process of route discovery is work as 
follow. If a source has route of the destination in its cache it utilize that route otherwise a 
route discovery protocol starts. The source node sends a Route Request packet by flooding 
the network. If the node receive the Route request is intended destination it returns Route 
reply to the source. The Route reply contains the list of best path form the source to 
destination. When the source receives this route reply packet it updates its route cache for 
sending further data. However if the node that receive the Route request is not a intended 
receiver it again forward the route request to its neighbor except the source also adding its 
address in the Route Request packet as illustrated in figure 2.4 ‎[38]. 
 
Figure 2.4: Route discovery in DSR 
During the route discovery process, the route record field is used to contain the sequence of 
hops which already taken. Initially, all senders initiate the route record as a list with a 
single node containing itself. The next intermediate node attaches itself to the list and so 
on. Each route request packet also contains a unique identification number called as 
request_id which is a simple counter increased whenever a new route request packet is 
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it is important to process the request in the following given order. This way we can make 
sure that no loops will occur during the broadcasting of the packets ‎[44]. 
 If the pair < source node address, request_id > is found in the list of recent route 
requests, the packet is discarded. 
 If the host's address is already listed in the request's route record, the packet is also 
discarded. This indicates removal of same request that arrive by using a loop. 
 If the destination address in the route request matches the host's address, the route 
record field contains the route by which the request reached this host from the 
source node. A route reply packet is sent back to the source node with a copy of 
this route. 
 Otherwise, add this node's address to the route record field and re-broadcast this 
packet. 
A route reply is sent back either if the request packet reaches the destination node itself, or 
if the request reaches an intermediate node which has an active route to the destination in 
its route cache. The route record field in the request packet indicates the sequence of hops 
which was considered. If the destination node is generating the route reply, it just takes the 
route record field of the route request and puts it into the route reply. If the responding 
node is an intermediate node, it attaches the cached route to the route record and then 
generates the route reply as shown in figure 2.5 ‎[41]‎[54]. 
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Figure 2.5: Propagation of the route reply in DSR 
B. Route Maintenance in DSR: 
Route maintenance can be accomplished by two different processes: 
 Hop-by-hop acknowledgement at the data link layer. 
 End-to-end acknowledgements. 
Hop-by-hop acknowledgement is the process at the data link layer which allows an early 
detection and re-transmission of lost packets. If the data link layer determines a fatal 
transmission error, a route error packet is being sent back to the sender of the packet. The 
route error packet contains the information about the address of the node detecting the 
error and the host’s address which was trying to transmit the packet. Whenever a node 
receives a route error packet, the hop is removed from the route cache and all routes 
containing this hop are truncated at that point ‎[44]. 
DSR maintain multiple routes to a destination in its cache. If by some reason a route is 
broken to some destination then it check its cache for another valid route to the same 
destination and does not re invoke the route reconstruction process. That’s how the route 
recovery process is faster in DSR than any other on demand routing protocol. However if it 
does not have an alternative route to the destination then it must reinitiate the route 
discover process. Placing the entire route information in both reply packet and data packet 
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create extra bandwidth and processing overhead. DSR is not scalable to large networks 
because it assumes that the diameter of the network is not more than 10 hops. Route 
discovery and route maintenances create extra bandwidth overhead ‎[38]‎[54]. 
Advantages of DSR: 
 A route is established only when it is required. 
 Supports multipath routing. 
 Loop-free routing. 
Disadvantages of DSR: 
 Not effective in large networks because of route overheads. 
 Suffers from the high latency encountered in route discovery. 
 The route maintenance mechanism is poor 
2.3.5 Dynamic MANET On-demand (DYMO): 
Dynamic MANET On-demand (DYMO) is a successor of the Ad hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol, it's known as AODVv2, defined in Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) Internet-Draft ‎[50]. It operates similarly to AODV. DYMO 
does not add extra features or extend the AODV protocol, but rather simplifies it, while 
retaining the basic mode of operation. DYMO is a purely reactive protocol in which routes 
are computed on demand i.e. as and when required and it employs sequence numbers 
which guarantees the orderly delivery of packets to the destination and maintains loop-free 
routes. Like AODV, DYMO implements three messages during the routing operation 
namely Route Request (RREQ), Route Reply (RREP) and Route Error (RERR). As 
DYMO uses AODV as the basis, it borrows "Path Accumulation" from Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR) ‎[51]‎[52]. 
43 
 
DYMO protocol has two basic operations: Route Discovery and Rout Maintenance. 
A. DYMO Route Discovery: 
The DYMO route discovery is very similar to that of AODV except for the path 
accumulation feature. The originating node initiates flooding of Route Requests (RREQ) 
throughout the network to find the target node, where each intermediate node records the 
route to the originating node. On receiving the RREQ, the target node responds with a 
Route Reply (RREP) which is sent in a unicast, hop-by-hop fashion towards the originating 
node. On receipt of RREP by originating node from the target node, the routes between the 
originating node and the target node are established in both directions as illustrated in 
figure 2.6. ‎[53] 
 
 
Figure 2.6: DYMO Route Discovery 
B. DYMO Route Maintenance: 
In order to respond to the changes in network topology, nodes maintain their routes and 
monitor the links over which the network traffic flows. When a received data packet is to 
be forwarded to some other node where the route is unknown or broken, the source of the 
packet is notified by sending Route Error (RERR) that indicates the current route is 
broken. The RERR generating node multicasts the RERR message to only those nodes 
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which are concerned with the link failure as shown in figure 2.7. Upon reception of a 
RERR message, the routing table is updated and the entry with the broken link is deleted. 
After deletion of the route entry, if any of the nodes face a packet to the same destination a 
new route discovery process needs to be initiated again ‎[52]‎[53]. 
 
Figure 2.7: RERR messages generation and propagation in DYMO 
 
Features of DYMO protocol: 
One of the special features of DYMO is that it is energy efficient. If a node is low on 
energy, it has the option to not participate in the route discovery process. In such a case, 
the node will not forward any of the incoming RREQ messages. It however will analyze 
the incoming RREP messages and update its routing tables for future use. In addition, the 
routing table of DYMO is comparatively less memory consuming than AODV even with 
"Path Accumulation" feature. Also the overhead for the protocol decreases with increased 
network sizes and high mobility. The performance evaluation shows that DYMO 
outperforms AODV as a MANET routing protocol ‎[51]. 
Advantages of DYMO: 
 DYMO is energy efficient when the network is large and shows a high mobility. 
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 The routing table of DYMO is comparatively less memory consuming than AODV 
even with Path Accumulation feature. 
 The overhead for the protocol decreases with increased network sizes and high 
mobility. 
Disadvantages of DYMO: 
 DYMO does not perform well with low mobility; which the control message 
overhead is rather high and unnecessary. 
 DYMO performs well when traffic is directed from one part of the network to 
another. However, it shows a degraded performance when there is very low traffic 
random and routing overhead outruns the actual traffic. 
 
 
2.4 Performance Comparison of Routing Protocols in MANETs: 
 
There are many research studies that provide comparisons of the routing protocols in terms 
of performance indexes. Simulation results of many research studies shows that AODV has 
the highest throughput followed by OLSR and GRP protocol, and the AODV protocol 
shows low data drop for 30 nodes according to ‎[55]. In the simulation experiment of ‎[56], 
AODV shows to have the overall best performance. It has an improvement of DSR and 
DSDV and has advantages of the both ‎[55]‎[56]. 
Simulation results of ‎[57] verified that AODV gives better performance as compared to 
DSR and DSDV. Figure 2.8 shows the packet delivery fraction versus number of nodes. It 
is obvious that the AODV routing protocol performance is better than DSDV and DSR as 
the number of nodes increases ‎[57]. 
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Figure 2.8: Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Number of Nodes ‎[57] 
Figure 2.9 shows that AODV provides the highest throughput as compared with DSDV 
and DSR ‎[57]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Throughput Vs. Number of Nodes ‎[57] 
2.5 Summary: 
Due to high degree of node mobility in MANETs; network topology is frequently 
changing, which makes routing in MANETs a challenging task. As a result, conventional 
routing algorithms are not suitable for these networks. Several routing protocols have been 
designed for ad hoc networks. Classifications of MANET routing protocols are discussed 
in this chapter. They are proactive, reactive, hybrid, hierarchical and geographical routing 
protocols Proactive routing protocols such as OLSR have high overhead traffic caused by 
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periodic exchange of control messages. Reactive routing protocols suffer from high initial 
delay. By studying some examples of reactive and proactive protocols, AODV gives better 
performance as compared to DSR and DSDV in terms of packet deliver ratio and 
throughput. 
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3.1 Introduction: 
The distinguishing characteristics of MANETs give the space for malicious attackers to 
find vulnerabilities that are not available in other types of wireless networks. MANETs are 
vulnerable to various attacks at all layers. So, much research has been conducted on 
providing security services for MANETs, because security is the main obstacle for the 
widespread adoption of MANET applications. MANETs are vulnerable in their 
functionality: intruders can compromise the operation of the network by attacking any of 
the physical, MAC or network layers. The network layer, especially the routing protocol, is 
vulnerable because of the use of cooperative routing algorithms, the limited computational 
ability of nodes, the exhaustible node batteries, the lack of clearly defined physical 
network boundary and the transient nature of services in the network. Standard information 
security measures such as encryption and authentication do not provide complete 
protection; thus, intrusion detection and prevention (IDP) mechanisms are widely used to 
secure MANETs ‎[4]‎[58]. 
Securing MANET is more difficult as channel is accessible to legitimate user and also to 
malicious attacker. Nodes are free to move arbitrarily due to which the network topology 
changes frequently and consequently the trust among the nodes creates complexity of 
routing of data ‎[59]. 
3.2 Classification of Security Attacks in MANETs: 
MANETs are vulnerable to attacks more than other conventional wired and wireless 
networks due to their special network attributes. Besides, different types of attacker with 
various motives can carry out the same type of attack. Defense mechanisms may need to be 
sensitive not only to the type of attack but also the type of attacker. Therefore, in this 
50 
 
section, we discuss taxonomy for security attacks; in the next section we will discuss 
taxonomy for attackers and their motives ‎[5]‎[10]. 
Security attacks can be categorized, according to the criteria that whether they disrupt the 
operation of a routing protocol or not, into two broad classes: passive and active attacks as 
shown in figure 3.1 below. Passive attacks, where adversaries do not make any emissions, 
are mainly against data confidentiality. In active attacks, malicious acts are carried out not 
only against data confidentiality but also data integrity. Active attacks can also aim for 
unauthorized access and usage of the resources or the disturbance of an opponent’s 
communications. An active attacker makes an emission or action that can be detected 
‎[60]‎[61]. 
 
Figure 3.1: Classification of attacks 
3.2.1 Passive Attacks: 
In passive attacks, the attacker attempts to discover valuable information but does not 
disrupt the operation of the routing protocol. Passive attacks can be grouped into 
eavesdropping and traffic analysis types as illustrated in figure 3.2 ‎[62]. 
 
Figure 3.2: Classification of passive attacks 
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1. Eavesdropping:  
Classified data can be eavesdropped by tapping communication lines, and wireless links 
are easier to tap. Therefore, wireless networks are more susceptible to passive attacks. In 
particular when known standards are used and plain data, i.e. not encrypted, are sent 
wirelessly, an adversary can easily receive and read the data.  The main aim of such attacks 
is to obtain the confidential information that should be kept secret during the 
communication. The information may include encryption keys, credit card numbers, 
location or passwords of the nodes ‎[14]‎[60]. 
2. Traffic Analysis: 
Not only the content of data packets is important for adversaries, but also the traffic pattern 
may also be very valuable for them. For example, confidential information about network 
topology can be derived by analyzing traffic patterns. In ad hoc networks the nodes closer 
to the base station, i.e. the sink, make more transmissions than the other nodes because 
they relay more packets than the nodes farther from the base station ‎[14]. 
Traffic analysis in ad hoc networks may reveal the following type of information: 
 Location of nodes. 
 Network topology used for communication 
 Roles played by nodes 
 Available source and destination nodes 
There are many techniques that may be used for traffic analysis: 
 Traffic analysis at the physical layer: in this attack only the carrier is sensed and the 
traffic rates are analyzed for the nodes at a location. 
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 Traffic analysis in MAC and higher layers: MAC frames and data packets can be 
demultiplexed and headers can be analyzed. This can reveal the routing 
information, topology of the network and friendship trees. 
 Traffic analysis by event correlation: events like detection in a sensor network or 
transmission by an end user can be correlated with the traffic and more detailed 
information, e.g. routes, etc., can be derived. 
 Active traffic analysis: traffic analysis can also be conducted as an active attack. 
For example, a certain number of nodes can be destroyed, which stimulates self 
organization in the network, and valuable data about the topology can be gathered 
‎[60]. 
Traffic analysis can also be used to organize attacks against anonymity. Adversaries can 
aim to detect the source of certain data packets, which may help localizing events and 
determining the weaknesses, capabilities, functions and owners of transferred data. 
Moreover, traffic patterns can pertain to the other confidential information such as the 
actions and the intentions ‎[63]. 
3.2.2 Active Attacks: 
In an active attack an adversary actually affects the operations in the attacked network or 
information system. It involves actions like modification and deletion of exchanging data 
to absorb packets destined to other nodes to the attacker for analyzing or disabling the 
network. So, active attacks are very severe attacks on the network. For example, the 
networking services may be degraded or terminated as a result of these attacks. Sometimes 
the adversary tries to stay undetected, aiming to gain unauthorized access to the system 
resources or threatening confidentiality and/or integrity of the content of the network 
‎[62]‎[63]. 
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Active attacks are classified into four classes as shown in figure 3.3 ‎[60]‎[63]‎[64]‎[65]. 
 
Figure 3.3: Classification of active attacks 
3.2.2.1 Physical Attacks: 
An adversary may physically damage hardware to terminate the nodes. This is a security 
attack that can also be considered to fall in the domain of fault tolerance, which is the 
ability to sustain networking functionalities without any interruption due to node failures. 
When nodes are unattended and can be reached physically by the adversary, they can be 
attacked by tampering techniques, such as microprobing, laser cutting, focused ion-beam 
manipulation, glitch attacks and power analysis. Node tampering can help in masquerading 
and denial-of-service attacks ‎[60]‎[63]. 
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks are also among the threats that can be listed within 
physical security attacks. An EMP is a short-duration burst of high-intensity 
electromagnetic energy that can produce voltage surges, which can damage electronic 
devices within range ‎[60]‎[63]. 
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3.2.2.2 Masquerade, Replay and Message Modification: 
A masquerading node acts as if it is another node. Messages can be captured and replayed 
by masquerading nodes. The content of the captured messages can be modified before 
being replayed. Various scenarios and threats can be developed based on these approaches 
‎[60]. 
Masquerading, message replay and content modification can be used to attack the integrity 
of the content of messages or services in a network. Attacks against the integrity of 
services can be considered as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks because they reduce the 
availability of some services ‎[60]. 
Masquerading, message replay and content modification can also be used against 
confidentiality by making the other nodes send the confidential data to a malicious node or 
by accessing the confidential data. They can also be used as techniques for gaining 
unauthorized access to system resources. 
An adversary may masquerade for phishing, which means deceiving someone in order to 
make him/her give confidential information voluntarily. A malicious node that 
masquerades an authorized node can ask another node to give information about 
passwords, keys, etc. 
3.2.2.3 Denial-of-Service Attacks: 
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack mainly targets the availability of network services. A 
DoS is defined as any event that diminishes a network’s capacity to perform its expected 
function correctly or in a timely manner. A DoS attack is characterized by the following 
properties ‎[60]‎[63]: 
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 Malicious: it is carried out to prevent the network from fulfilling its intended 
functions. It is not accidental. Otherwise it is not in the domain of security but 
reliability and fault tolerance. 
 Disruptive: it degrades the quality of services offered by the network. 
 Asymmetric: the attacker puts in much less effort compared to the scale of the 
impact made on the network. 
A DoS attack can be organized at any networking protocol layer: 
A. DoS in the physical layer: 
The mentioned physical attacks in this section can also be perceived as DoS attacks 
because they prevent a network from performing its expected functions. 
Jamming attack, which is a DoS in the physical layer, can be performed by a malicious 
device that jam a wireless carrier by transmitting a signal at that frequency. The jamming 
signal contributes to the noise in the carrier and its strength is enough to reduce the signal-
to-noise ratio below the level that the nodes using that channel need to receive data 
correctly. 
B. DoS in the link layer: 
The algorithms in the link layer, especially MAC schemes, present many exploitation 
opportunities for DoS attacks. A malicious node can continuously jam a channel to create a 
MAC layer DoS attacks by performing any of the following cases: 
 Whenever an RTS signal is received, a signal that collides with the CTS signal is 
transmitted. Since the nodes cannot start transmitting data before receiving the 
CTS, they continue sending RTS signals. 
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 If the MAC scheme is based on sleeping and active periods, jamming only the 
active periods can continuously block the channel. 
 False RTS or CTS signals with long data transmission parameters are continuously 
sent out, which makes the other nodes that do virtual carrier sensing wait forever. 
 Acknowledgement spoofing, where an adversary sends false link layer 
acknowledgements for overheard packets addressed to neighboring nodes, can also 
be an effective link layer DoS attack. 
C. DoS in the network layer (against Routing Schemes): 
Ad hoc networks are infrastructureless and have special routing challenges, as mentioned 
in chapter 2, which bear additional opportunities for new types of DoS attack against the 
network layer protocols for such networks. These attacks generally fall into one of two 
categories: routing disruption attacks or resource consumption attacks as shown in figure 
3.4 ‎[60]. 
 
Figure 3.4: Classification of DoS attacks in the network layer 
Routing disruption attacks aim to make the routing scheme dysfunction, making it unable 
to provide the required networking services. The goal of resource consumption attacks is 
to consume network resources such as bandwidth, memory, computational power and 
energy ‎[60]. 
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Malicious node can disrupt network operations by not following the routing protocol 
specifications as follows ‎[66]: 
a. Modification: 
Malicious node may illegally modify the routing information of the received messages 
before forwarding them, it can alter one or several fields in the message, depends on the 
goals that it may want to achieve. Such attack compromises the integrity of route 
discovery. By altering routing information, a malicious node can take control of a route, 
can cause network traffic to be dropped or redirected, or take a long route to the destination 
increasing communication delays. Malicious node may increase the destination sequence 
number to make route appear fresher, decrease the hop count to make it appear shortest or 
even replace the source (destination) IP address in the IP header with another IP address to 
impersonate another node ‎[66]. 
Routing control messages (RREQ, RREP and RERR) can be modified in the following 
ways: 
1- Modification of RREQ: The freshness of a RREQ message is represented by the 
RREQ ID, and based on this field along with the originator IP address, the 
intermediate node accepts or refuses to forward the RREQ message. Therefore a 
malicious node may increase the RREQ ID to convince other nodes to accept the 
modified RREQ message as illustrated in figure 3.5. It may also increase the 
destination sequence number to make route appear fresher, decrease the hop count 
to make route appear shortest or even replace the source address in the IP header 
with non-existent IP address to cause loss of the RREP message. 
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Figure 3.5: Malicious Node Modifies a RREQ message 
2- Modification of RREP: Nodes use the destination sequence number to determine 
the freshness of the information received from the source node. When several 
RREP messages are received by a source node, it chooses the one with a largest 
Destination Sequence number and accordingly constructs a route to a destination. 
Therefore, a malicious node may increase the Destination Sequence number of the 
RREP message to guarantee that its RREP message or the RREP message passing 
through it as illustrated in figure 3.6. As a result malicious node invades the 
established route and can carry out other malicious actions. 
 
Figure 3.6: Malicious Node Modifies a RREP message 
3- Modification of RERR: When a malicious node receives a RERR message, it can 
replace an unreachable destination IP address with another IP address, or append 
new unreachable destination IP addresses that, in fact, can be reached through the 
malicious node as illustrated in figure 3.7. It also can send out a faked RERR 
message without being triggered by the receipt of any RERR message. The 
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modified RERR message can be send to the neighbors in the precursor list, or even 
to those that are not in the precursor list of the malicious node, in order to disable 
active routes and disrupt the routing operation ‎[66]. 
 
Figure 3.7: Malicious Node Modifies a RERR message 
Table 3.1 lists the fields in a RREQ, RREP, and RERR message that the malicious 
node may manipulate. 
Table 3.1: Possible malicious modifications of routing protocols fields messages 
Fields Messages Modifications 
Type  All Change the message type 
Flags  All Reverse the setting 
Hop count  RREQ, RREP 
Decrease it to update other nodes reverse 
route tables, or increase it to suppress its 
update 
RREQ ID  RREQ 
Increase it to make the faked RREQ 
message acceptable, or decrease it to 
make the RREQ message unacceptable 
Dest_IP  RREQ, RREP Replace it with another IP address 
Dest_SEQ  RREQ, RREP 
Increase it to update other nodes forward 
route tables, or decrease it to suppress its 
update 
Orig_IP  RREQ, RREP Replace it with another IP address 
Orig_Seq  RREQ 
Increase it to update other nodes reverse 
route tables, or decrease it to suppress its 
update 
Prefix size  RREP 
Increase/Decrease the size of the subnet 
prefix 
Lifetime  RREP 
Decrease/increase it to shorten/extend the 
lifetime of the route entry updated by this 
RREP message 
Dest count  RERR 
Modify it according to the number of 
unreachable destinations included in the 
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RERR message 
Un_Dest_IP  RERR Replace it with another IP address 
Un_Dest_SEQ RERR 
Increase it to update other nodes routing 
table, or decrease it to suppress this entry 
 
b. Fabrication Attack: 
Fabrication refers to attack performed by generating false routing messages. Such kind of 
attacks can be difficult to identify as they come as valid routing constructs, especially in 
the case of fabricated routing error messages, which claims that a neighbor can no longer 
be contacted ‎[66]. In AODV there are two kinds of fabrication: 
1- Forge reply: The malicious node sends forged routing control message in response 
to legitimate routing message. Forge Reply is mainly related to the generation of 
faked RREP and RREP-ACK messages, trigged respectively by the receipt of 
legitimate RREQ and RREP messages as illustrated in figure 3.8. Malicious node 
impersonates destination address in the received RREQ, sends a forge RREP 
message, and establishes a route with a source node, in order to intercept or to drop 
data packets. 
 
Figure 3.8: Malicious Node Modifies a fake RREP message 
2- Active forge: In this attack the malicious node sends a forged routing control 
message without prior reception of any routing message, to achieve malicious 
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purpose such as; break route or delete route, by using respectively a forge RREQ or 
forged RERR message. Malicious node may eventually Flood the network with 
RREQ messages to consume the network resources. 
c. Dropping attack: 
Dropping control packets might be the greatly benefit for both selfish and malicious nodes. 
Particularly, once dropping the RREQ packets, a selfish node prevents the established 
routes from passing through it and consequently it saves its energy for transmitting its own 
packets. Likewise, a malicious node may directly disrupt the routing operation by dropping 
routing messages to prevent new route from being established, or isolate a node or a group 
of nodes from communicating with the rest of the network. Dropping RERR packets 
extends the duration of use of the broken routes and consequently the network bandwidth 
falls sharply since no packet reaches its destination. In some cases malicious node may 
carry out more sophisticated dropping to divert security mechanisms by performing 
periodic, selective or random dropping. 
d. Black Hole Attack: 
Black hole attack is a type of active attack that exploits the route reply message (RREP) 
feature of the ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol. This attack 
involves some modification of the data stream or the creation of a false stream. A 
malicious node sends RREP messages without checking its routing table for a fresh route 
to a destination. A RREP message from a malicious node is the first to arrive at a source 
node. Hence, a source node updates its routing table for the new route to the particular 
destination node and discards any other RREP messages from other neighboring nodes or 
even from the actual destination node. Once a source node saves a route, it starts sending 
buffered data packets to a malicious node hoping they will be forwarded to a destination 
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node. Nevertheless, a malicious node (performing a black hole attack) drops all data 
packets rather than forwarding them ‎[34]. Black hole attack will be explained in more 
details in section 3.4 in this chapter. 
e. Gray Hole Attack: 
This attack is more sophisticated than the black hole attack, instead of dropping all data 
packets a malicious node selectively drops packets. It may drop packets originating from 
(or destined to) certain specific node(s) in the network while forwarding all the packets for 
other nodes, which limits the suspicion of its wrongdoing. It can also alternate by interval 
of time between malicious behavior (dropping packets) and honest behavior (forwarding 
packets). To render the attack more difficult to detect malicious node can combines 
selective drop, and periodic or random dropping ‎[61]‎[66]. 
f. Wormhole Attack: 
Also called tunneling attack, is composed of two (or group of) colluding malicious nodes 
directly linked to each other through wormhole tunnel established by means of a wired 
link, a high quality wireless out-of-band link or a logical link via packet encapsulation. 
One malicious node forwards received RREQ control messages from one point in the 
network to the second malicious node in another point many hops away in the network 
through the wormhole tunnel as illustrated in figure 3.9. When the second malicious node 
receives these tunneled packets it replays them in its neighborhood. Therefore the 
malicious nodes are included in the established route and may now intercept or drop data 
packets instead of forwarding. ‎[66]. 
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Figure 3.9: Wormhole Attack 
 
Wormhole attack is difficult to detect, and can be launched even against communications 
that provide authenticity and confidentiality. Detection of wormhole attack requires the use 
of an unalterable and independent physical metric, such as time delay or geographical 
location ‎[61]‎[67]. 
g. Rushing Attack: 
This attack can be carried out against on-demand routing protocols that use duplicate 
suppression in their operations. In order to reduce the route discovery overhead, each 
intermediate node processes only the first received route request packets and rejects any 
duplicate packets that arrive later. Rushing node exploits this mechanism by quickly 
disseminating route request packets in order to be included in the discovered routes, as 
illustrated in figure 3.10. Rushing attack can be performed in many ways: by transmitting 
at a higher wireless transmission power level, by ignoring delays at MAC or routing layers, 
by keeping other nodes’ transmission queues full or by using a wormhole tunnel ‎[67]. 
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Figure 3.10: Rushing attack 
 
h. Resource depletion: 
Also known as the sleep deprivation attack, it can be achieved by constantly generating 
fake routing packets and flooding it through the whole network, creating routing loops or 
injecting unnecessary data flows in some parts of the network. Hence, the malicious node 
may effectively consume the network bandwidth, power energy, and the processing time of 
the legitimate nodes. To achieve this end, the malicious node applies the strategies 
illustrated below ‎[66]: 
1- RREQ flooding: The malicious node floods the network either by modify 
incoming RREQ messages to make them appear fresh by increasing their RREQ ID 
or by continuously fabricate a large number of fake RREQ packets as in figure 
3.11. In both cases the fake RREQ packets will be rebroadcast by the malicious 
node’s neighbors and propagated to the rest of the network. 
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Figure 3.11: RREQ flooding 
 
2- Routing loop: The malicious node creates a loop(s) between forwarding nodes 
within a real route by sending a fake RREP, therefore the nodes involved in the 
loop(s) consume about 10 times more energy than the normal cases. Furthermore, 
the data packets transmitted in the loop will be dropped in the end and some nodes 
will be isolating from the rest of the network. 
3- Data flow injection: In this attack malicious node injects large volumes of data 
flows on the network to congest existing routes and set up unnecessarily data flows 
to any point in the network up to its extreme transmission bandwidth. This type of 
attack is difficult to defend against, because it is hard to differentiate between 
legitimate and malicious data flows. 
i. Impersonation Attack: 
Impersonation also known in the literature as spoofing or masquerading attack is launched 
by using other node’s identity (IP address) in outgoing routing packets. The malicious node 
may impersonate source node to communicate with destination node, or the destination 
node to reply the source node, as illustrated in figure 3.12, or even announce new route 
with high destination sequence number or reduced hop count to the others nodes. Therefore 
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the attacker can read, alter the received packets or even totally (entirely) isolate the real 
(authentic node (the real owner of the address) from the network. Impersonation attack 
sometimes is the first step for more sophisticated attacks ‎[66]. 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Impersonation Attack 
j. Sybil Attack: 
A Sybil attack is an improved version of impersonation, in which a single node pretends to 
be many different nodes at the same time, by using multiple distinct addresses while 
transmitting. An attacker can obtain (acquire) an address through two manners; it can usurp 
an existing address or forging (fabricate) one if the network has no restriction to the 
allowed. This reduces the effectiveness of fault-tolerance schemes and poses a significant 
threat to geographic routing protocols. Apart from these services it may also affect the 
performance of other schemes such as misbehavior detection, voting-based algorithms, 
data aggregation and fusion and distributed storage ‎[60]‎[66]. 
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D. DoS in The Transport Layer: 
Transport layer protocols are also susceptible to security threats. Some attack scenarios 
applicable at this layer are listed below: 
a. SYN Flooding Attack: 
The SYN flooding attacks are the type of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, in which 
attacker creates a large number of half opened TCP connection with victim node. These 
half opened connection are never completes the handshake to fully open the connection 
‎[14]. 
b. Session Hijacking 
Attacker in session hijacking takes the advantage to exploits the unprotected session after 
its initial setup. In this attack, the attacker spoofs the victim node’s IP address, finds the 
correct sequence number i.e. expected by the target and then launches various DoS attacks. 
In Session hijacking, the malicious node tries to collect secure data (passwords, secret 
keys, logon names etc) and other information from nodes. Session hijacking attacks are 
also known as address attack which make affect on OLSR protocol. The TCP-ACK storm 
problem may occur when malicious node launches a TCP session hijacking attack. The 
attacker "X" injects session data, and node "1" sends acknowledgement packet to node "2". 
Packet will not contain any sequence number that node 2 is expecting. It results in, when 
node "2" receive the packet and tries to resynchronize the TCP session with node "1". This 
process is repeated over and over that leads to ACK storm. Hijacking a session in a 
connectionless transport protocols such as User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is even easier 
than connection oriented protocols ‎[14]. 
c. Transport layer acknowledgement spoofing: 
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False acknowledgement or acknowledgement with large receiver windows may make the 
source node generate more segments than the network can handle, causing congestion and 
degrading the network capacity. 
d. Replaying acknowledgement: 
In some transport layer protocols, such as TCP-Reno, acknowledging the same segment 
multiple times indicates negative acknowledgement. A malicious node can replay an 
acknowledgement multiple times to make the source node believe that the message was not 
delivered successfully. 
e. Jamming acknowledgements: 
A malicious node can jam the segments that convey acknowledgements. This may lead to 
the termination of a connection. 
f. Changing sequence number: 
In protocols like RMST and PSFQ, a malicious node may change the sequence number of 
a fragment and make the destination believe that some fragments have been lost. 
g. Connection request spoofing: 
A malicious node can send many connection requests to a node, using up its resources such 
that it cannot accept any other connection request ‎[60]. 
E. DoS in The Application Layer: 
Application layer protocols can also be exploited in DoS attacks. Many of them were 
mentioned in the previous section. Protocols like node localization, time synchronization, 
data aggregation, association and fusion can be cheated or hindered, as explained in that 
section. For example, a malicious node that impersonates a beacon node and gives false 
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location information or cheats with regard to its transmission power, i.e. transmitting with 
less or more power than it is supposed to do, may hamper the node localization scheme. 
Since these kinds of attack diminish the related network service, they can also be 
categorized as DoS attacks ‎[14]‎[60]. 
Other attacks in the application layer are: 
a. Repudiation Attacks: Repudiation refers to a denial of participation in all or part 
of the communications. Many of encryption mechanism and firewalls used at 
different layer are not sufficient for packet security. Application layer firewalls may 
take into account in order to provide security to packets against many attacks. For 
example, spyware detection software has been developed in order to monitor 
mission critical services. 
b. Malicious Code Attacks: Malicious code attacks include, Viruses, Worms, 
Spywares, and Trojan horses, can attack both operating system and user 
application. 
 
3.2.2.4 Misbehaving: 
Misbehaving can also count as a cyber threat. Some nodes within the network may 
misbehave to gain unfair shares of the limited networking resources, i.e. they may employ 
selfishness. For example, by using the MAC scheme, a misbehaving node can force the 
other nodes into longer back offs and free the network resources for its own use. Nodes 
may also be selfish by refusing to relay others’ messages. If every node acts like this, then 
selfishness may have an impact similar to a DoS attack ‎[60]‎[63]. 
70 
 
Another means of misbehaving may be aimed at a charging scheme by denying payment 
for services received. Not always Ad hoc networks are free-of-charge environments where 
everybody collaborates to communicate with each other through a license-free channel. For 
example, Mesh networks provide wireless multihop access to broadband services. 
Similarly, there can be multihop cellular networks where nodes are allowed to access the 
network through ad hoc multihop wireless links when they are out of the coverage area 
provided by the infrastructure, as shown in Figure 3.13. In both of these cases nodes reach 
a service provider and are supposed to pay for the services they get from the provider 
‎[60]‎[63]. 
 
Figure 3.13: Multihop cellular networks 
 
Several attacks are envisaged against the charging schemes in these kinds of network: 
 Refusal to pay: The source node may deny that it carried out communications 
specified on a bill. 
 Dishonest rewards: In multihop networking, intermediate nodes should relay the 
packets of others. To motivate intermediate nodes to forward the packets of others 
instead of being selfish, rewarding mechanisms, such as paying them, can be 
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designed. In this case, a misbehaving node may want to appear that it was involved 
in forwarding some packets, even though it was not. 
 Free riding: Intermediate nodes on the route between the source and destination 
can piggyback their packets on to ongoing communications to avoid paying the bill. 
For example, routing node A can piggyback its packet to routing node B onto 
packets from the source to the destination in Figure 3.13. 
3.3 Classification of Security Attackers in MANETs: 
Similar to attacks, attackers can also be categorized according to many criteria. According 
to ‎[60], attackers are classified based on the characteristics shown in figure 3.14. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Classification of attackers 
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1. Emission: An attacker can be passive or active; this matches the classification of 
attacks. Active attacks are carried out by active attackers and passive attacks by 
passive attackers. 
2. Location: An attacker can be an insider or an outsider. An insider is a node that has 
been compromised or tampered with, and it is a part of the attacked network. The 
attacker may learn all the cryptographic information owned by the compromised 
node when it is an insider. Therefore, stealthy active attacks can be organized by 
insider attackers. Outsider attacks can be either passive or active. In other words, an 
insider can be perceived as a legal entity inside the network such as a node that has 
been registered or a node that is allowed to access the network. An outsider is 
typically a node that is not welcome on the network. 
3. Quantity: There may be a single attacker or more than one. When there are 
multiple attackers, they can collaborate with each other, which can be considered a 
more difficult case to defend against. 
4. Motivation: An adversary carries out attacks with a certain motivation, such as 
breaking confidentiality, integrity and privacy. This may also be done to gain 
access to unauthorized resources. An attacker may also attack to hinder the 
operations of the other side. Selfishness, avoiding payment or getting unearned 
rewards may be other motives. 
5. Rationality: Needlessness, malfunctioning nodes and naïve users may also become 
threats to a network. However, needlessness is not the only reason for ‘irrational’ 
attacks – those where the results of the attack may not be worth the cost of 
attacking. An attacker may attack simply in order to attack and break a security 
system, perceiving this as a challenge to prove himself/herself. Therefore, some 
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attacks are irrational where the results of these attacks may not be worth their cost. 
Rational attackers carry out their attacks to obtain something which is worth more 
than the cost of the attack. 
6. Mobility: Attackers can be fixed or mobile. Detecting mobile attackers and 
defending against them is generally more difficult than defending against a fixed 
adversary ‎[60]‎[63]. 
 
3.4 Black Hole Attack in MANETs: 
Routing protocols in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks by their nature are distributed routing 
protocols with the assumption that all nodes in the network will cooperate truly and 
participate honestly. However, the existence of malicious nodes makes this assumption not 
true. Such nodes may drop the packets, if they are not the destination, without forwarding 
them or may disrupt the routing discovery and maintenance processes resulting in 
abnormal network operation that affects the performance of the network and may cause 
denial of service ‎ ‎[23]. 
A black hole attack is a kind of denial of service (DoS) where a malicious node can attract 
all packets by falsely claiming a fresh route to the destination and then absorb them (drop 
all packets) without forwarding them to the destination ‎[24]. 
In reactive routing protocols such as AODV, the destination sequence number (dest_seq) is 
used to describe the freshness of the route. A higher value of dest_seq means a fresher 
route. On receiving a RREQ, an intruder can advertise itself as having the fresher route by 
sending a Route Reply (RREP) packet with a new dest_seq number larger than the current 
dest_seq number. In this way the intruder becomes part of the route to that destination ‎[25]. 
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Figure 3.15 illustrates the black hole attack where nodes S and D are the source and 
destination respectively and node B is the black hole. 
 
Figure 3.15: Black Hole Attack Illustration 
A black hole has two properties: First, the node exploits the ad hoc routing protocol to 
advertise itself as having a valid route to a destination, even though the route is spurious 
with the intention of intercepting packets. Second, the node consumes the intercepted 
packets. In an ad hoc network that uses the AODV protocol, a black hole node absorbs the 
network traffic and drops all packets ‎[24]. 
3.4.1 Behavioral Analysis of the Black Hole Node: 
The black hole node is a strange malicious node joins the network with the intention of 
dropping the transmitted data packets instead of delivering them to the desired destination. 
The following are the main behavioral characteristics of the black hole node ‎[68]: 
1. It snoops on its neighbors to discover which node is preparing to send an RREQ. 
2. For any received RREQ, the black hole node propagates an RREP claiming that it 
has a direct link to the destination. 
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3. It constantly attempts to locate itself within the transmission range of any source 
node in order to reply as quickly as possible. This requires a continual movement of 
the black hole node in the network. Moreover, its movement speed may be higher 
than the normal nodes. 
Analyzing these characteristics, there are two main key points from the behavior of the 
black hole node. First, it never contributes in the operation of route discovery (i.e. never 
broadcasts the received RREQs). Moreover, for any route including a black hole, the black 
hole always appears as the last hop before the destination. Second, it's expected that the 
number of the routes that the black hole contributes in them is greater than the number of 
routes that the normal node contributes in them ‎[68]. 
3.5 Summary: 
The characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks make them vulnerable to many attacks in all 
layers. This chapter provided classifications of attacks in MANETs. Different types of 
attacker with various motives can carry out the same type of attack. So, a classification of 
attackers also provided in this chapter. 
In the network layer, attacks may be routing disruption attacks or resource consumption 
attacks. Malicious node may modify, fabricate or drop packets. Black hole attack is a 
modification and dropping attack in the network layer. It is very severe attack because it 
can make a denial of service (DoS) in the network. To mitigate its effect and to avoide the 
malicious nodes, we have to protect the integrity of the routing control messages during 
route discovery process. 
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4.1 Introduction: 
Routing is an essential operation in all network types and it has special importance in ad 
hoc networks; because in such networks, nodes are operating not only as hosts but they are 
also operating as routers. Therefore, any breakthrough in the routing process has a direct 
impact to the performance of the whole network. This is the reason why routing is targeted 
in many kinds of attacks in MANETs especially black hole attack. 
In this chapter an enhanced and modified routing protocol "Enhanced RID-AODV" is 
presented. The goal of this protocol is to avoid malicious nodes to be used as malicious 
nodes in the routing processes. 
 
4.2 Evolution of the Proposed Protocol: 
In this section we provide an enhanced and modified protocol based on previous one to 
provide a solution for the black hole attack problem when multiple nodes are acting as 
malicious black hole nodes. 
The proposed protocol, "Enhanced RID-AODV" or "ERID-AODV ", is a modification and 
enhancement of the RID-AODV protocol proposed in ‎[34]. RID-AODV protocol was 
proposed as combination of previous two protocols, namely IDSAODV (which is proposed 
in ‎[33]) and RAODV (proposed in ‎[35]). Figure 4.1 illustrates the evolution of ERID-
AODV protocol. 
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of the proposed protocol (Enhanced RID-AODV) 
 
4.2.1 Getting advantages of the preceding protocols 
The proposed protocol (Enhanced RID-AODV) provides a modification and enhancements 
to preceding protocol RID-AODV, which is combination of two protocols: IDSAODV and 
RAODV. Therefore, we got all advantages of the preceding protocols in mitigating the bad 
impact of the existing of malicious black hole nodes in the ad hoc network. The benefits of 
the preceding protocols together with the proposed enhancements, we got better results in 
terms of performance metrics as will be shown in the next chapter. 
1. Getting advantages of Intrusion Detection System AODV (IDSAODV) 
protocol: 
By analyzing the output file obtained from the simulation, it was found that there were 
always a second route between the nodes which are communicating. RREP message 
arrived from different possible routes, for example one arrived at the source on average at 
t= 1.2765 seconds as opposed to the RREP message arriving from the black hole node on 
average at t= 0.2059 seconds. It is reasonable to assume that an RREP message will arrive 
from the black hole earlier than the actual destination with a higher probability as the black 
hole does not waste any time. While the second RREP is from the intended destination. 
However, in some cases, this idea may not work. For instance the second RREP can be 
received at the source node from an intermediate node which has stale information about 
IDSAODV 
RAODV 
RID-AODV ERID-AODV 
Previous Work Proposed 
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the destination node or the second RREP message may come from the black hole node if 
the real destination node is nearer than the black hole node. 
Based on the above arguments and observations, the IDSAODV was proposed to use the 
second route for message delivery and it was investigated by simulation that this approach 
improves the network performance under the black hole attacks in an ad hoc network. 
Actually IDSAODV improved the packet deliver ratio (PDR) in MANET with a single 
black hole node. 
2. Reverse AODV (RAODV): 
Although RAODV has not been designed to prevent black hole attacks and it was 
developed with the aim of solving path failure problem, authors of ‎[34] proposed to use it 
in mitigating the effects of black hole attacks in ad hoc networks. 
On demand routing protocols, including AODV, is based on single route reply RREP 
message. The lost of RREP message may cause a significant waste of performance. 
For example, consider the case in figure 4.2 below where S is a source node, D is a 
destination node and others are intermediate nodes. When route request message RREQ is 
broadcasted by node S and each node on a path builds reverse path to the previous node, 
finally the reverse path D321S is built. This reverse path is used to deliver RREP 
message from node D to the source node S. If node 1 moves towards the arrow direction 
shown in the figure and goes out of transmission range of node 2, RREP missing will occur 
and the route discovery process will be useless. However, there are several alternative 
paths built by the RREQ message are ignored. 
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Figure 4.2: RREP Delivery Fail 
 
Thus, R-AODV was proposed to avoid RREP loss and improve the performance of routing 
in MANET. In R-AODV, route reply message is not unicast, rather, destination node uses 
reverse RREQ (R-RREQ) to find source node. R-AODV protocol discovers routes on-
demand using a reverse route discovery procedure. During route discovery procedure 
source node and destination node plays same role from the point of sending control 
messages. Thus, after receiving RREQ message, destination node floods reverse request 
(R-RREQ), to find source node. When source node receives an R-RREQ message, data 
packet transmission is started immediately. Figure 4.3 shows that when the when node 1 
has moved and went outside the transmission range of node 2, when using RAODV, 
destination does not unicast reply along pre-decided shortest reverse path. Rather, it floods 
R-RREQ to find source node S. And forwarding path to destination is built through this R-
RREQ. 
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Figure 4.3: Reverse RREQ (R-RREQ) from destination to source node 
 
R-AODV uses absolutely same procedure of RREQ of AODV to deliver route reply 
message to source node. R-AODV protocol can reply from destination to source if there is 
at least one path to source node. In this manner, R-AODV prevents a large number of 
retransmissions of route request messages, and hence diminishes the congestion in the 
network. Moreover, R-AODV improves the routing performance such as packet delivery 
ratio and end-to-end delay. Therefore, success rate of route discovery may be increased 
even though high node mobility situation. 
4.3 The enhancements in the proposed protocol 
The detection of the malicious nodes and mitigation their effects can be achieved by 
creating and maintaining dynamic blacklist in each node according to some criteria. Then 
each non malicious node will prevent sending or forwarding to the neighboring nodes that 
exist in its own blacklist either in the forward or reverse path In other words, each node 
will not use blacklisted nodes as intermediate nodes. Dynamic blacklist means that each 
node adds and removes nodes to or from its blacklist automatically according to specific 
criteria as will be explained in this section. 
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The criteria for each node to add another node's address in its blacklist is the repetitive 
mismatch in the hash value of the receiving frames (layer 2 frame) from the same 
neighboring node. So, each node keeps a counter for each other node that receives a frame 
from the neighboring nodes. If there is a mismatch between the received hash value and the 
calculated value, the corresponding counter for the sending (or forwarding) node will be 
incremented. When the counter reaches some threshold value                 , then 
the corresponding neighboring node will be blacklisted. 
Each node keeps small number of counters. If node    has   neighboring nodes (  is ⊆ of 
all nodes) and    is receiving from   nodes (     ⊆      ), then   will keep only   
counters for this purpose. For example, for the network in figure 4.4, the node 9 will 
maintain less than or equal to 5 counters. 
 
Figure 4.4: Each node maintains a small number of counters 
In addition, we can get another advantage of the nature of the reverse route discovery 
procedure in RAODV to create full path (bidirectional) integrity check implemented in 
hop-by-hop basis to detect any modifications on the traversing packets and to detect the 
causing nodes. 
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To distinguish between hash value mismatch that may occur as a result of normal link 
failure, which is from the nature of MANETs due to mobility of nodes that communicate 
wirelessly, or from the existence of malicious nodes, the threshold value 
                 should be considered as a function of mobility (variable threshold). 
If the node is moving with relatively high speed the mismatch of hash values is most likely 
due to normal link failure, and so the threshold should be high. On the other hand, if there 
are many hash value mismatches while the node is moving slowly, there is most likely a 
malicious node. So, the value of                 is directly proportional to the node 
speed and it was implemented by using equation (5.1): 
 
                              (4.1) 
Where   is the threshold value when the node speed is zero. 
 
The malicious node may not act as a black hole all the time, it may become benign for 
some period of time, then it may (or may not) resume its malicious activities. So, when a 
node adds another node's address to its blacklist, the blacklisted node will not stay in its 
blacklist forever. However, it will be blacklisted for a previously specified period of time. 
So, when a node is added to another node's blacklist, not only the address of the blacklist is 
added but also the expiry time for that node to be released from that blacklist. The 
blacklisted node expiry time is computed using equation (5.2): 
                                                   (4.2) 
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Each time the node wants to send (or forward) a packet to a neighbouring node, it will 
check if it is blacklisted, and if so it will also check the expiry time for that node. If it's 
expired, it will be removed from the blacklist of that node and its corresponding counter 
and expiry timer will be reset. Because of that it is dynamic blacklist. Figure 4.5 illustrates 
the idea of the using counters to create blacklist with expiration time for the blacklisted 
nodes. In this figure, because the counter in node 2 that is associated to node 3 has 
exceeded the threshold value, node 2 added node 3 to its blacklist. So, node 2 will not 
forward to node 3 until the time exceeds the blacklist expiry time for node 3 which is 37 in 
this example. 
 
Figure 4.5: Using blacklist to avoid forwarding to blacklisted nodes for a pre-specified period 
 
Now when a node wants to send (or forward) a packet, in either the forward path or reverse 
path, it will check the routing table to decide what is the next hop. Then it will check if the 
next hop is blacklisted or not, if it's blacklisted, it will check the blacklist expiry time. If 
the next hop node is still blacklisted, then the node will remove that node from its 
neighbour list and run the handle link failure procedure. Then the node will try to send (or 
forward) the packet by using another path. 
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As a result, we can get a secure path that avoids the black hole malicious nodes during 
routing packet as shown in figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6: Secure Routing Path 
The criterion for the reverse path is the round trip time (    ).     is the length of time it 
takes the RREQ to be sent (or forwarded) plus the length of time it takes for the R-RREQ 
to be received by the node. As we assumed that all the nodes are trusted, we can measure 
    in the normal behaviour, and use it as a reference. Any change in this value indicates 
that the reply was not from the original destination; so, this value can be used to detect the 
malicious node. 
The node will first measure Round Trip Time (     ). Then it will calculate the average 
hop-to-hop time (    ) using the following equation: 
      
   
           
 (4.3) 
 
Now, the New      (       ) should satisfy the following condition: 
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The sequence diagram of the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol is shown in figure 4.7.     
values are shown in normal behaviour and in malicious behaviour. 
 
Figure 4.7: Sequence Diagram for the Enhanced RID-AODV 
 
4.3.1 Hashing Function: 
To implement the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol a new field was added in the route 
request (RREQ) and reverse route request (R-RREQ). The original and modified RREQ 
message formats are shown in figure 4.8 and figure 4.9 respectively. 
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    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |     Type      |J|R|G|D|U|   Reserved          |   Hop Count   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         Broadcast ID                          | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Destination IP Address                     | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                  Destination Sequence Number                  | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Originator IP Address                      | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                  Originator Sequence Number                   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         Request Time                          | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 4.8: Original Route Request (RREQ) Message Format ‎[46] 
    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |     Type      |J|R|G|D|U|   Reserved          |   Hop Count   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         Broadcast ID                          | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Destination IP Address                     | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                  Destination Sequence Number                  | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Originator IP Address                      | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                  Originator Sequence Number                   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         Request Time                          | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                          Hash Value                           | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 4.9: Modified Route Request (RREQ) Message Format 
 
Because we adopt the Reverse-AODV, we also modified the reverse route request (R-
RREQ) message format to handle the hash value. 
The original R-RREQ message format as proposed in ‎[35] is shown in figure 4.10 and the 
modified one in the Enhanced RID-AIDV protocol is shown in figure 4.11 below. 
 
 
88 
 
    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |     Type      |J|R|G|D|U|   Reserved          |   Hop Count   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         Broadcast ID                          | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Destination IP Address                     | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                  Destination Sequence Number                  | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Originator IP Address                      | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                          Reply Time                           | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
 
Figure 4.10: Reverse Route Request (R-RREQ) Message Format 
 
    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |     Type      |J|R|G|D|U|   Reserved          |   Hop Count   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         Broadcast ID                          | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Destination IP Address                     | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                  Destination Sequence Number                  | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Originator IP Address                      | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                          Reply Time                           | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                          Hash Value                           | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 4.11: Modified Reverse Route Request (R-RREQ) Message Format 
In our protocol we used one-way hashing function on the level of packets in the routing 
discovery control messages. The purpose of using a hash function is to produce a 
"fingerprint" of the message. This fingerprint will be used for route request (RREQ) packet 
authentication and integrity check in each hop while traversing from source node to the 
destination node and for reverse route request (R-RREQ) from destination to source; 
resulting in a two-way (bidirectional) control packet authentication and integrity check. 
For our implementation of the "Enhanced RID-AODV" protocol, we used a simple hash 
function in the purpose of having a small number of arithmetic operations because of the 
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limitations in recourses and power in the nodes in MANET. Besides, the hash function was 
applied to three fields of the RREQ and R-RREQ messages only and not to the whole 
message: 
 Destination Sequence Number (          ). 
 Source Address (       ) 
 Broadcast ID (     ). 
Destination sequence number (          ) is susceptible to be modified by the malicious 
node to claim that it has a fresher route than the genuine one. The pair: source address ( 
      ) and broadcast ID (     ) uniquely identify an RREQ, so this combination will 
form a unique representation of the whole RREQ message. Therefore, we can make the 
hashing value for these fields instead of taking the hashing value of all message fields. 
 
                            (4.5) 
where   is the hash value and      is the hash function. 
 
The input of the hashing function was considered as array of blocks each one is an 8-bit 
integer in array     
The hash function was implemented as a recursive sequence according to equation 5.4: 
 
                          (4.6) 
Where   is a seed value, the initial value of   (which is      ) is zero and the final value of 
  (which is        ) is the hash value. (  is the array length) 
90 
 
4.3.2 Pseudocodes and Flowchart for the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol 
The pseudocodes for the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol are presented in algorithms 4.1, 
4.2 and 4.3. Algorithm 4.1 is a pseudocode that describes how the node decides to add 
other nodes to or from its blacklist. In other words, how the node detects malicious nodes 
and adds them to its blacklist. 
 
Pseudocode for the proposed protocol: How the node decides to add or remove other 
nodes in its blacklist: 
1. Generate new hash value (       ). 
2. Compare the generated hash value          with the received hash value with 
the packet        . 
3. if(                  
then,                                 
4. Check the speed of the node (         ). 
5. Compute the threshold that will be used to consider a node as blacklisted  
                             
6. //To add a node to a blacklist 
if                                   
                                         
then, 
a.                      . 
b.                                             
                
Algorithm 4.1: Pseudocode for the proposed protocol: How the node decides to add other nodes in its 
blacklist 
Algorithm 4.2 is a pseudocode that describes how the node decides to remove other nodes 
from its blacklist 
 
Pseudocode for the proposed protocol: How the node decides to add or remove other 
nodes in its blacklist: 
//To remove a node from a blacklist 
if                                
                                            
then, 
a.                         . 
b.                          
c.                                  
Algorithm 4.2: Pseudocode for the proposed protocol: How the node decides to remove a node from its 
blacklist 
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Algorithm 4.3 is a pseudocode that describes how the node behaves when sending or 
forwarding a packet. 
 
Pseudocode for the proposed protocol: How the node behaves when sending or 
forwarding a packet: 
if(                              
then, 
// Generate route error message 
           
  
Algorithm 4.3: Pseudocode for the proposed protocol: how the node behaves when sending or forwarding a 
packet 
 
Figure 4.12 shows the flowchart for the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol. It includes the 
RREQ and R-RREQ phases and how each node takes decision of adding or removing 
nodes to its blacklist. 
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Figure 4.12: Flowchart of the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol 
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4.4 Summary: 
This chapter presented the designed and proposed protocol "Enhanced RID-AODV". This 
protocol gets advantages of previous works and it was enhanced to overcome the 
drawbacks of its preceding. The enhancement provides a blacklist for the malicious nodes 
in each node so that each node will avoid these nodes during routing packets. Besides, 
using variable thresholds eliminates the effect to normal link failure in deciding to add a 
node to the blacklist. Using these blacklists can decrease the delay and increase the 
throughput and packet delivery ratio. 
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5.1 Introduction: 
In this chapter, we present our simulation experiments that were carried out to test our 
protocol and to provide a good comparison between "Enhanced RID-AODV" protocol and 
other protocols in terms of performance metrics. 
5.2 Simulation Tool: 
Network Simulator version 2 (NS-2) is one of the most popular network simulators that are 
appropriate to simulate the wireless networks ‎[69]. In our research we used ns-2 because it 
is widely adopted in scientific community, an open source simulator and does not require 
any licenses. 
Ns-2 is an open-source discrete event-driven simulator that is written in C++, which is 
Object Oriented Language (OOL). Ns-2 supports simulation of several routing protocols 
over wired and wireless networks and supports the ability to develop or modify protocols. 
It has become the most widely used open source network simulator ant it has many types 
of mobility models and traffic generators. The results of the simulation that performed 
based on NS-2 are NAM file (display file) and trace file (analysis file) that differ in storage 
size according to the network size ‎[70]. 
To interpret the resulting trace files after each simulation, AWK software was used. AWK is 
an interpreted programming language for processing text files; it is very useful when 
analyzing traces ‎[70]. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates an overview about the steps of the simulation and analysis using ns-2 
simulator. 
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Figure 5.1: Overview of simulation and analysis using ns-2 
 
5.3 Simulation and Network Environment 
The simulation was carried out using ns-2 simulator under Ubuntu Linux operating system. 
During the simulation the packet header (aodv_packet.h file) of the AODV route request 
and route reply (changed to route reverse request) are modified to hold the hash value 
(        ) with packet. In addition to that, the files aodv.h and aodv.cc were modified to 
implement the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol together with previous protocols. Also, files 
/common/node.h and /common/node.cc have been modified to hold the   counters and the 
blacklists inside each node. Simulation was carried out by referring to many resources 
including but not limited to references ‎[71]‎[72]‎[73]. 
The simulation area is a square field of 1000m x 1000m with fixed sender and receiver 
nodes that communicate using intermediate mobile nodes, which are moving randomly 
during simulation time (these random movements were generated using 'setdest' tool) and 
the intermediate nodes are sending random traffic pattern among each other (created using 
'cbrgen.tcl' command). The sender and receiver were placed in points (200,200) and 
(800,800) respectively. So they are out of the transmission range of each other and all 
traffic between them is through the moving intermediate nodes. The parameter considered 
in this simulation is given in table 5.1 below. 
 
Execute ns-2 
Commands 
TCL scripts 
Simulation 
Output: 
(Trace and Nam files) 
Parsing and 
analysis: 
Awk script 
 
Simulation 
Results 
 
Topology 
Generator 
Network 
Animation 
View nam file 
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Table 5.1: Parameters used in simulation 
Parameter Value 
Simulator ns-2 
Routing protocol 
AODV, IDSAODV, R-AODV, RID-
AODV, Enhanced RID-AODV 
Simulation time 100 sec 
Simulation area 1000m x 1000m 
Number of nodes 40 
Number of malicious 
nodes 
0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
Sender node Fixed at point (200,200) 
Receiver node Fixed at point (800,800) 
Intermediate nodes Moving randomly 
Maximum speed of 
mobile nodes 
Three scenarios: 20, 30 & 40  m/s 
Data Rate 50 Kb/s 
Pause time 0 sec 
Transport type UDP, CBR 
Data packet size Default 
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11 
 
In this research, the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol together with four preceding protocols 
were implemented and simulated with the same environment parameters to be able to make 
a comparison among them. That include: the genuine AODV protocol with simulation of 
black hole malicious nodes, the IDSAODV protocol proposed in ‎[33], RAODV proposed 
in ‎[35], RID-AODV that was proposed on ‎[34] and our proposed protocol which is 
Enhanced RID-AODV. For each protocol many scenarios were generated to simulate the 
existence of different number of malicious nodes in order to study the effect of multiple 
malicious nodes on network performance and the effectiveness of each protocol to 
compare among these protocols; we made as many combinations of nodes to act as 
malicious nodes and then we computed the average of the results. 
The simulation was carried out in three scenarios by changing the maximum speed of the 
nodes. The idea is to test the effectiveness of these protocols as the speed to the nodes 
increased. The three scenarios are: 
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1. Scenario 1: maximum speed = 20 m/s. 
2. Scenario 2: maximum speed = 30 m/s. 
3. Scenario 3: maximum speed = 40 m/s. 
5.4 Performance Metrics: 
In this simulation, the following four performance metrics were considered and computed 
as the average of many cases in all scenarios of multiple malicious nodes for all the 
protocols in the study. Four separate scripts were generated to compute these performance 
metrics using awk command. 
1. Throughput: The amount of data transferred over the period of time expressed in 
kilobits per second (kbps). Throughput has been calculated using equation (5.1): 
           
                             
               
 (5.1) 
 
2. Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): The percentage ratio of the total number of data 
packets received by the destination node to the number of data packets sent by the 
source node as in equation (5.2). 
    
                               
                           
      (5.2) 
 
3. Average End-to-End Delay: The average delay between the sending of the data 
packet by the source node and its receipt at the destination node. This includes all 
the delays caused during route acquisition, buffering and processing at intermediate 
99 
 
nodes, retransmission delays at the MAC layer, etc. The average end-to-end delay 
was computed using equation (5.3). 
                
                                       
                         
 (5.3) 
 
4. Overhead Ratio: The ratio of the total number of control packets sent at the 
routing level and the total number of packets sent from the source node as in 
equation (5.4). 
                   
                                 
                                 
 (5.4) 
 
5.5 Simulation Results 
We can investigate the efficiency of the new protocol graphically by using the NAM 
(network animator) tool to take screenshots for the network traffic for the case of using 
RID-AODV protocol which is illustrated in figure 5.2, and the case of using the "Enhanced 
RID-AODV" protocol illustrated in figure 5.3. Both figures were taken for the same 
network scenarios and screenshots were taken at approximately the same moment of the 
simulation time as shown in the figures. 
100 
 
   
Figure 5.2: Screenshots when using RID-AODV 
 
   
Figure 5.3: Screenshots when using "Enhanced RID-AODV" – traffic is routed to avoid black hole node 
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It's clear from the figures that the use of blacklists during making decisions of packet 
forwarding has advantages in avoiding the malicious nodes (black hole nodes) and to use 
only the legitimate nodes for routing data packets to reach the intended destination. 
5.5.1 Results of the First Scenario: 
In the first scenario, we made the nodes moving in a maximum speed = 20 m/s. Table 5.2 
shows the results of the throughput for the case of the existence of black hole nodes (as the 
number of black hole nodes increases up to 7 malicious nodes), and these results are 
illustrated graphically in figure 5.4. 
Table 5.2: Effect of number of malicious nodes on throughput for different protocols in first scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV ERID-AODV 
1 3.98 15.96 25.23 38.05 41.16 
2 1.87 8.51 25.85 38.66 40.40 
3 2.16 7.86 26.49 37.71 40.58 
4 1.08 5.60 26.36 38.80 40.48 
5 0.68 4.36 27.30 38.14 40.62 
6 0.29 2.79 26.17 37.69 40.84 
7 0.00 1.92 26.42 36.55 40.97 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Throughput vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols in first scenario 
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We can notice, from the figure, the effects of increasing the number of malicious nodes in 
the network on the throughput. One black hole in the network has a huge impact in 
decreasing the throughput, and few numbers of malicious nodes are able to prevent all 
traffic from reaching the destination. IDSAODV provides a small improvement to 
throughput; but, this is not enough because the throughput is still very low. R-AODV 
provides more improvement and stability to the throughput as the number of malicious 
nodes increases. RID-AODV also improved the throughput. The Enhanced RID-AODV 
protocol provides more improvement to throughput and takes advantages of its preceding 
in stability and robustness in avoiding multiple black hole nodes. 
 
The packet delivery ratio (PDR) was computed for the using equation (5.2), the results are 
shown in table 5.3 and graphically in figure 5.5. 
Table 5.3: Effect of number of malicious nodes on PDR for different protocols in first scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV ERID-AODV 
1 7.44 29.84 47.16 71.12 76.94 
2 3.50 15.91 48.33 72.27 75.53 
3 4.03 14.70 49.52 70.50 75.87 
4 2.02 10.47 49.28 72.54 75.68 
5 1.26 8.15 51.04 71.30 75.94 
6 0.54 5.22 48.92 70.46 76.34 
7 0.00 3.59 49.39 68.32 76.58 
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Figure 5.5: PDR vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols in first scenario 
 
The figure above shows the percentage of the number of receives packets by the 
destination node to the total number of the sent packets by the source node. It is obvious 
the impact of malicious nodes in dropping the packets to reduce the received packets. Only 
one black hole node in the network is able to reduce the PDR to around 10% of the original 
PDR. We can notice the improvements provided by IDSAODV, R-AODV and RID-
AODV protocols. Also, this figure verifies the efficiency of the Enhanced RID-AODV 
protocol in improving the PDR and in providing stability against increasing the number of 
malicious nodes. 
 
One of the major improvements of the Enhanced RID-AODV is decreasing the average 
end-to-end delay. This performance metric was computed for the proposed protocol and 
the preceding ones, the results are shown in table 5.4 and figure 5.6. 
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Table 5.4: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Average End-to-End Delay for different protocols in first 
scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV ERID-AODV 
1 9.06 29.50 46.61 79.69 44.07 
2 0.40 13.28 34.48 72.35 52.24 
3 0 8.52 38.87 64.77 51.08 
4 0 4.62 30.17 65.94 55.21 
5 0 2.57 34.31 64.66 49.95 
6 0 1.28 26.84 59.78 49.98 
7 0 0 26.60 70.65 45.86 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Average End-to-End Delay for different protocols in 
mitigating multiple black hole attacks. 
 
From the results in the table and the figure, it is clear that the previous protocols have an 
impact in increasing the average end-to-end delay with the increase in the throughput and 
PDR. However; the Enhanced RID-AODV, due to the use of blacklists the nodes chooses 
the optimized path. As a result the average end-to-end delay has decreased as compared to 
RID-AODV. This is an important improvement because time is a significant factor in ad 
hoc networks. 
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Also the overhead ratio has been improved by the proposed protocol. Results of applying 
Enhanced RID-AODV protocol and the preceding protocols on overhead are shown in 
table 5.5 and figure 5.7. 
Table 5.5: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Overhead Ratio for different protocols in first scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV ERID-AODV 
1 5.90 5.19 16.55 13.74 12.20 
2 5.43 4.92 16.58 13.33 12.13 
3 4.59 5.26 16.86 13.43 11.74 
4 4.36 5.05 16.68 13.25 11.95 
5 3.42 5.01 16.68 13.41 11.91 
6 3.08 4.37 16.80 13.12 11.75 
7 2.66 4.44 16.41 14.04 11.89 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Overhead Ratio vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols in first scenario 
The previous protocols not only increase the end-to-end delay but also impose more 
overhead. The increase of the overhead ratio is mainly due to the new R-RREQ message. 
However, as a result of applying blacklists in the intermediate nodes, some control packets 
are prevented to be transmitted across the network. As a result, the overhead ratio 
decreased. 
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5.5.2 Results of the Second Scenario: 
 
In the second scenario, the intermediate nodes are moving in a maximum speed of 30 m/s. 
The four performance metrics have been computed for this scenario. Throughput results 
for this scenario are presented in table 5.6 and shown in figure 5.8 below. 
 
Table 5.6: Effect of number of malicious nodes on throughput for different protocols in second scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV 
ERID-
AODV 
1 43.4 10371 41314 .4343 41314 
2 731 1430. 44314 .4344 41314 
3 7341 1333 44341 .0314 47344 
4 731. 4304 44314 .1343 413. 
5 7331 430. 44341 .13.1 41344 
6 7341 .33. 44374 .4304 47341 
7 7 .371 4034. .4333 4131 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Throughput vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols in second scenario 
As shown in the figure, throughput has been improved in this scenario by applying the 
previous mechanisms. The Enhanced RID-AODV provides an improvement as compared 
with its preceding RID-AODV. 
 
Packet delivery ratio (PDR) results for the second scenario are shown in table 5.7 and in 
figure 5.9 below: 
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Table 5.7: Effect of number of malicious nodes on PDR for different protocols in second scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV ERID-AODV 
1 4311 .134 34341 01340 04314 
2 1344 4.341 34341 01341 04340 
3 7304 10343 34344 01 043.4 
4 7344 431 373.. 0.303 00341 
5 7313 4343 34303 0.344 00344 
6 7334 434 34341 44301 04344 
7 7 3344 31340 04370 043.4 
 
 
Figure 5.9: PDR vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols in second scenario 
It is obvious that the percentage number of received data by the destination node has been 
improved by the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol more than with previous protocols. We 
note also that the PDR value with no malicious nodes does not reach 100%, that because of 
the effect of the normal link failure due to mobility of the intermediate nodes that 
communicated wirelessly. 
Average end-to-end delay results for the second scenario are shown in table 5.8 and figure 
5.10 below: 
Table 5.8: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Average End-to-End Delay for different protocols in 
second scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV ERID-AODV 
1 47310 41330 .73.3 40344 44311 
2 134 14344 44344 44314 4733 
3 7 1344 44343 04374 3.31 
4 7 1341 40344 47304 34313 
5 7 43.3 4034 4434. 443.. 
6 7 .30 4734 40371 4434. 
7 7 1 44344 04344 4431 
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Figure 5.10: Average End-to-End Delay vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols in second 
scenario 
Also in the second scenario, the results of applying the Enhanced RID-AODV protocol 
show that the average end-to-end delay has decreased. This prove the efficiency of this 
protocol. 
 
Overhead ratio results for the second scenario are shown in table 5.9 and figure 5.11 
below: 
Table 5.9: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Overhead Ratio for different protocols in second scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV ERID-AODV 
1 43.4 3314 1434. 14313 1131 
2 3334 4341 13340 1434. 11314 
3 4331 334. 14310 11341 17313 
4 433. 3331 13304 14341 1734. 
5 .30. 3341 13341 1431 1730. 
6 1374 333. 133.. 11340 17300 
7 4301 3343 133.4 11334 1131. 
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Figure 5.11: Overhead Ratio vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols in second scenario 
Similar to the first scenario, the overhead ratio has decreased as a result of using the 
Enhanced RID-AODV protocol due to the effect of the blacklists. 
 
5.5.3 Results of the third scenario: 
 
In the third scenario, the nodes are moving in a maximum speed = 40 m/s. Results of the 
throughput in this scenario are illustrated in Table 5.10 and illustrated in figure 5.12 below. 
 
Table 5.10: Effect of number of malicious nodes on throughput for different protocols in third scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV 
ERID-
AODV 
1 .344 1.3.4 44314 .0371 41370 
2 7331 131 44304 .0340 47344 
3 7344 3313 44374 .03.1 47314 
4 7343 4300 443.3 .3303 .131. 
5 7 1333 403.0 .431. .4310 
6 7 .374 4430. .33.4 .1304 
7 7 .343 44341 .4304 .4300 
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Figure 5.12: Throughput vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols in third scenario 
Also in this scenario, the Enhanced RID-AODV has the highest throughput among other 
protocols in this study. 
 
Packet delivery ratio (PDR) results for the third scenario are shown in table 5.11 and figure 
5.13 below: 
Table 5.11: Effect of number of malicious nodes on PDR for different protocols in third scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV ERID-AODV 
1 4374 44314 44314 413.4 04300 
2 7313 1433 41314 41340 03334 
3 7344 1344 44340 41304 04331 
4 7344 4311 41344 4434. 0.313 
5 7 4341 31314 41374 013.4 
6 7 3344 41314 44314 04341 
7 7 4374 41313 44344 04340 
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Figure 5.13: PDR vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols in third scenario 
As the maximum speed of the intermediate nodes has increased, using the Enhanced RID-
AODV protocol provides the highest packet delivery ratio. 
 
Average end-to-end delay results for the third scenario are shown in table 5.12 and figure 
5.14 below: 
Table 5.12: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Average End-to-End Delay for different protocols in 
third scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV ERID-AODV 
1 0370 44344 41344 40340 37343 
2 7344 1301 4431 443.4 443.4 
3 43.. 434. 4.304 4033. 443.1 
4 7 .34. 44374 043.1 4331. 
5 7 4341 43304 44374 44340 
6 7 4301 40313 0.314 34334 
7 7 1341 .437. 41344 3434. 
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Figure 5.14: Average End-to-End Delay vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols in third 
scenario 
In this scenario the average end-to-end delay has decreased as compared to RID-AODV 
providing enhancements in all scenarios. 
 
Overhead ratio results for the third scenario are shown in table 5.13 and figure 5.15 below: 
Table 5.13: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Overhead Ratio for different protocols in third scenario 
No. of black 
hole nodes 
AODV IDSAODV R-AODV RID-AODV ERID-AODV 
1 3344 3343 14343 11344 11341 
2 331 3341 14331 14370 11374 
3 3344 3300 14300 11304 1730 
4 43.4 3344 14341 14344 11374 
5 4304 4344 1431 11341 11341 
6 4314 431. 10374 14311 17344 
7 4344 3331 14314 14311 11344 
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Figure 5.15: Overhead Ratio vs. number of malicious nodes for different protocols in third scenario 
 
The enhanced RID-AODV protocol required less overhead than R-AODV and RID-AODV 
protocols in this scenario also as shown in the figure. 
 
5.6 Summary of Results Analysis: 
1. Simulation results show that only one black hole in the network - without any 
solution - is able to decrease the PDR to almost 10% of its value without black 
hole. And only a small number of black holes in the network are able to reduce the 
throughput and the packet delivery ratio to almost zero resulting in denial of service 
(DoS) for the legitimate nodes. 
 
2. It is obvious from the figures that the proposed protocol is suitable for mitigating 
multiple black hole attacks because of the stability in the curves while increasing 
the number of malicious nodes that are acting the black hole attack. 
 
3. Average end-to-end delay has decreased in the proposed protocol as compared to 
the preceding one in all scenarios with the following rates: 
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a. In scenario 1 end-to-end delay has decreased by 27.1 % in average. 
b. In scenario 2 end-to-end delay has decreased by 27.8 % in average. 
c. In scenario 3 end-to-end delay has decreased by 28.3 % in average. 
d. For all cases (as an average) end-to-end delay has decreased by 27.7 % 
 
4. There is an increase in throughput also in all scenarios: 
a. In scenario 1 throughput has increased by 7.3 % 
b. In scenario 2 throughput has increased by 7.7 % 
c. In scenario 3 throughput has increased by 8.5 % 
d. For all cases (as an average) throughput has increased by 7.8 % 
 
5. Enhancement in Packet Deliver Ratio (PDR) in all scenarios as follows: 
a. In scenario 1 PDR has increased by 5.2%. 
b. In scenario 2 PDR has increased by 5.5 % 
c. In scenario 3 PDR has increased by 5.8  % 
d. For all cases (as an average) PDR has increased by 5.5 % 
 
6. Overhead ratio also has decreased as compared to the preceding protocol but in 
small percentage: 
a. In scenario 1 overhead ratio has decreased by 1.53 % 
b. In scenario 2 overhead ratio has decreased by 0.84 % 
c. In scenario 3 overhead ratio has decreased by 0.95 % 
d. For all cases (as an average) overhead has decreased by 1.11 % 
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As a summery, we can say that the major enhancement in our protocol "Enhanced RID-
AODV" was in reducing the average end-to-end delay which is a very important factor in 
the ad hoc networks because they are used in vital and critical applications that requires 
fast installation and fast data transfer. In addition we gained an increase the throughput and 
the packet delivery ratio, also a small decrease in the overhead ratio. 
 
5.7 Summary: 
In this chapter, we provide our simulation experiments that were carried out in order to 
verify the performance of the proposed protocol "Enhanced RID-AODV". Our results and 
analysis are based on four performance metrics: Throughput, Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), 
Average End-to-End Delay and overhead ratio. There were three scenarios for network 
environment in the simulation process. In each scenario, the intermediate nodes are moving 
in different speed. 
As a summary of the results, "Enhanced RID-AODV" shows a better performance as 
compared to its proceedings. The use of blacklist in each node makes these nodes to select 
the optimized path for the traversing packets across the network. The average end-to-end 
delay and the overhead ratio have been decreased and the throughput and PDR have been 
increased in all scenarios. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion and Future Works 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Thesis Conclusion 
6.2 Future Work 
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6.1 Thesis Conclusion: 
MANET has some unique helpful characteristics that make the design of suitable security 
mechanisms a very challenging and important issue. As security is the main obstacle for 
adoption of mobile ad hoc networks in many applications, a lot have to be done to ensure 
security in these networks to be used in practical applications. 
This thesis aims mainly at providing Enhanced RID-AODV protocol that is capable to 
avoiding multiple malicious nodes that are acting as black hole nodes in mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs). The proposed protocol provides an enhancement to a preceding 
existing protocol, which is also a combination of two other protocols. The problem in the 
previous protocols, which we tried to solve in our protocol, is imposing more overhead and 
increasing end-to-end delay.  
Enhanced RID-AODV protocol is distinguished from its preceding ones because it is light 
weighted and simulation results show an increase in throughput and packet delivery ratio, 
while the average end-to-end delay and overhead ratio have been decreased. Due to the 
fact that the proposed protocol is based on creating dynamic blacklist in each node aiming 
at preventing  using the neighbouring malicious nodes as intermediate nodes. So, the nodes 
will choose the optimized path from the source to the destination. 
Many cases and scenarios were simulated to check the performance of the proposed 
protocol and compare it with the preceding ones. The simulation results show the 
improvement in performance metrics in all cases. 
 
 
 
118 
 
6.2 Future Work: 
Enhanced RID-AODV protocol may provide a general solution for many network layer 
attacks that target the routing process. So, it is recommended to check this protocol on 
other network layer attacks. 
In this version of Enhanced RID-AODV protocol, each node in the MANET creates its 
own blacklist and when a node adds another node's address to its blacklist, that node will 
be blacklisted for a pre-specified period of time. This aims at giving a chance for a falsely 
blacklisted node to be removed from the blacklist. However, if there is a real malicious 
node, it will continue to be blacklisted then delisted then blacklisted and so on. Another 
suggested work is to make a reputation measure for each node by creating a counter of how 
many times a node has been blacklisted. This reputation measure may be used to decide 
how long to blacklist a malicious node. Therefore, the blocking period of a node will be a 
variable that is directly proportional to how many times that node has been blacklisted in 
its history. However, this idea should be simulated to test its performance because it may 
have other drawbacks. 
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Appendix A: 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
MANET Mobile Ad Hoc Network 
DSDV Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing 
OLSR Optimized Link State Routing Protocol 
AODV Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector 
DSR Dynamic Source Routing 
DYMO Dynamic MANET On-demand 
RREQ  Route Request 
RREP  Route Reply 
RERR  Route Error 
R-RREQ Reverse Route Request 
PDR Packet Delivery Ratio 
PAN Personal Area Networking 
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
NS Network Simulator 
NAM Network Animator 
CREQ Route Confirmation Request 
IDSAODV Intrusion Detection System AODV 
MPR Multi Point Relays 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
MAC Medium Access Control 
IP Internet Protocol 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) have emerged as a major next generation wireless networking technology. Due to 
their inherent capabilities of instant communication, they are used for wide range of applications such as emergency 
operations and disaster recovery. On the other hand, many challenges are facing MANETs including security, routing, 
transmission range and dynamically changing topology with high nodes mobility. Security is considered as the main 
obstacle for the widespread adoption of MANET applications. Black hole attack is a type of DoS attack that can disrupt 
the services of the network layer. It has the worst malicious impact on network performance as the number of malicious 
nodes increases. Several mechanisms and protocols have been proposed to detect and mitigate its effects using different 
strategies. However, many of these solutions impose more overhead and increase the average end-to-end delay. This 
paper proposes an enhanced and modified mechanism called "Enhanced RID-AODV", based on a preceding 
mechanism: RID-AODV. The proposed enhancement is based on creating dynamic blacklists for each node in the 
network. Each node, according to criteria depends on the number of mismatches of hash values of received packets as 
compared with some threshold values, can decide to add or remove other nodes to or from its blacklist. Enhanced RID-
AODV was implemented in ns-2 simulator and compared with three previous solutions for mitigating multiple black 
hole attacks in terms of performance metrics. The results show an increase in throughput and packet delivery ratio and 
a decrease in end-to-end delay. 
Keywords: Enhanced RID-AODV, MANET Security, Network Layer Attack, Multiple Black Hole Attacks. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a self-
configuring network formed by co-operating and 
independent nodes that connect and communicate 
with each other wirelessly without pre-existing 
infrastructure. If two mobile nodes are within each 
other transmission range, then they can 
communicate with each other directly; otherwise, 
the nodes in between have to forward the packet 
for them. So, mobile nodes are not only 
functioning as hosts but they are also functioning 
as routers [1]. 
Because MANETs are infrastructure-less 
networks with no centralized administration, they 
can be self deployed in short time. The easy 
deployment of nodes, self-organizing nature and 
freedom of mobility make MANETs suitable for a 
broad range of applications. They can be useful in 
disaster recovery and emergency operations where 
there is not enough time or resources to install and 
configure an infrastructure. They are also used in 
other applications; for example, in military 
services, maritime communications, vehicle 
networks, casual meetings, campus networks, robot 
networks… etc [2]. 
On the other hand, MANETs are vulnerable to 
various attacks at all layers. So, much research has 
been conducted on providing security services for 
MANETs, because security is the main obstacle for 
the widespread adoption of MANET applications. 
MANETs are vulnerable in their functionality: 
intruders can compromise the operation of the 
network by attacking at any of the physical, MAC 
or network layers. The network layer, especially 
the routing protocol, is vulnerable because of the 
use of cooperative routing algorithms, the limited 
computational ability of nodes, the exhaustible 
node batteries, the lack of clearly defined physical 
network boundary and the transient nature of 
services in the network. Standard information 
security measures such as encryption and 
authentication do not provide complete protection; 
thus, intrusion detection and prevention (IDP) 
mechanisms are widely used to secure MANETs 
[3]. 
Attacks in MANET can be divided, according 
to the criteria that whether they disrupt the 
operation of a routing protocol or not, into two 
classes: passive attacks and active attacks. In 
passive attacks, the attacker attempts to discover 
valuable information but does not disrupt the 
operation of the routing protocol. Active attacks; 
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however, involve actions like modification and 
deletion of exchanging data to absorb packets 
destined to other nodes to the attacker for 
analyzing or disabling the network. Some typical 
kinds of active attacks that can be performed 
against MANETs are: black hole attack, gray hole 
attack, flooding attack, selfish attack, rushing 
attack, spoofing, wormhole attack, sleep 
deprivation and impersonation [4]. 
Black hole attack is a type of active attack that 
exploits the route reply message (RREP) feature of 
the ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) 
routing protocol. This attack involves some 
modification of the data stream or the creation of a 
false stream. A malicious node sends RREP 
messages without checking its routing table for a 
fresh route to a destination. A RREP message from 
a malicious node is the first to arrive at a source 
node. Hence, a source node updates its routing 
table for the new route to the particular destination 
node and discards any other RREP messages from 
other neighboring nodes or even from the actual 
destination node. Once a source node saves a route, 
it starts sending buffered data packets to a 
malicious node hoping they will be forwarded to a 
destination node. Nevertheless, a malicious node 
(performing a black hole attack) drops all data 
packets rather than forwarding them [5]. 
So, the black hole attack is a DoS attack that 
disrupts the services of routing layer by exploiting 
the route discovery process of AODV. According 
to many research studies that focus on studying the 
effects of malicious attacks on network 
performance, the simulation results show that the 
black hole attack is more dangerous than other 
attacks in the network layer [6]. 
Several mechanisms and protocols have been 
proposed to detect and mitigate its effect using 
different strategies. However, many of these 
solutions impose more overhead and increase the 
average end-to-end delay. 
In this paper, we propose a modified and 
enhanced protocol, called "Enhanced RID-AODV", 
based on a preceding mechanism: RID-AODV. It 
aims to detect and mitigate the effects of multiple 
black hole attacks in MANETs by increasing the 
throughput and packet delivery ratio (PDR) and by 
decreasing the end-to-end delay as compared to its 
predecessors. The proposed idea in this paper is 
creating a dynamic blacklist in each node, then 
prevent sending or forwarding to blacklisted nodes 
in both directions for a pre-specified period of 
time. The criteria to add a node in the blacklist is 
reaching a threshold in the number of mismatched 
hashing value from that node. The threshold is a 
function of mobility (variable threshold) to cancel 
the effect of normal link failure which is most 
likely caused by nodes mobility. The proposed 
solution, "Enhanced RID-AODV", was 
implemented in ns-2 simulator and compared with 
three previous solutions (namely RID-AODV, 
RAODV and IDSAODV) for mitigating multiple 
black hole attacks in terms of performance metrics. 
The results show an increase in throughput and 
packet delivery ratio and a decrease in end-to-end 
delay. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: 
section II provides some details about the black 
hole attack, section III provides the related work in 
detection and mitigation of black hole attack. The 
proposed solution is introduced in section IV, the 
simulation and network environment are described 
in section V, in section VI, the analysis and the 
results are discussed. Finally, the conclusion is 
presented in section VII. 
2. CLASSIFICATION OF SECURITY 
ATTACKS IN MANETS 
 Security attacks can be categorized, according 
to the criteria that whether they disrupt the 
operation of a routing protocol or not, into two 
broad classes: passive and active attacks. Passive 
attacks, where adversaries do not make any 
emissions, are mainly against data confidentiality. 
In active attacks, malicious acts are carried out not 
only against data confidentiality but also data 
integrity. Active attacks can also aim for 
unauthorized access and usage of the resources or 
the disturbance of an opponent’s communications. 
An active attacker makes an emission or action that 
can be detected [7][8]. 
The active attacks are generally launched by 
compromised nodes or malicious nodes. They are 
classified into four groups: 
• Dropping Attacks: Compromised nodes or 
selfish nodes can drop all packets that are 
not destined for them. Dropping attacks 
can prevent end-to-end communications 
between nodes, if the dropping node is at 
a critical point, most of routing protocol 
has no mechanism to detect whether data 
packets have been forwarded or not. 
• Modification Attacks: Black hole and 
Sinkhole attacks are example of 
modification and dropping attacks. These 
attacks modify packets and disrupt the 
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 
 10
th
 January 2016. Vol.83. No.1 
© 2005 - 2015 JATIT & LLS. All rights reserved.  
 
ISSN: 1992-8645                                                       www.jatit.org                                                          E-ISSN: 1817-3195      
 
158 
 
overall communication between network 
nodes. In such attacks, the compromised 
node advertises itself in such a way that it 
has shortest path to the destination. 
Malicious node then captures important 
routing information and uses it for further 
actions such as dropping or selective 
forwarding attacks. 
• Fabrication Attacks: In fabrication attack, 
the attacker send fake message to the 
neighboring nodes without receiving any 
related message. The attacker can also 
sends fake route reply message in 
response to related legitimate route 
request messages. 
• Timing Attacks: In this type of attacks, 
attackers attract other nodes by 
advertising itself as a node closer to the 
actual node. Rushing attacks and hello 
flood attacks uses this technique. 
Malicious node may illegally modify the routing 
information of the received messages before 
forwarding them, it can alter one or several fields 
in the message, depends on the goals that it may 
want to achieve. The modification may include the 
route request (RREQ), route reply (RREP) and/or 
route error (RERR) as shown in table 1 below [9]. 
Table 1: Possible malicious modifications of routing protocols 
fields messages 
Fields Messages Modifications 
Type  All  Change the message type 
Flags  All  Reverse the setting 
Hop count  RREQ, 
RREP  
Decrease it to update other 
nodes reverse route tables, or 
increase it to suppress its update 
RREQ ID  RREQ  Increase it to make the faked 
RREQ message acceptable, or 
decrease it to make the RREQ 
message unacceptable 
Dest_IP  RREQ, 
RREP  
Replace it with another IP 
address 
Dest_SEQ  RREQ, 
RREP  
Increase it to update other nodes 
forward route tables, or decrease 
it to suppress its update 
Orig_IP  RREQ, 
RREP  
Replace it with another IP 
address 
Orig_Seq  RREQ  Increase it to update other nodes 
reverse route tables, or decrease 
it to suppress its update 
Prefix size  RREP  Increase/Decrease the size of the 
subnet prefix 
Lifetime  RREP  Decrease/increase it to 
shorten/extend the lifetime of 
the route entry updated by this 
RREP message 
Dest count  RERR  Modify it according to the 
number of unreachable 
destinations included in the 
RERR message 
Un_Dest_IP  RERR  Replace it with another IP 
address 
Un_Dest_SEQ RERR Increase it to update other nodes 
routing table, or decrease it to 
suppress this entry 
3. BLACK HOLE ATTACK IN MANETS 
Routing protocols in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
by their nature are distributed routing protocols 
with the assumption that all nodes in the network 
will cooperate truly and participate honestly. 
However, the existence of malicious nodes makes 
this assumption not true. Such nodes may drop the 
packets, if they are not the destination, without 
forwarding them or may disrupt the routing 
discovery and maintenance processes resulting in 
abnormal network operation that affects the 
performance of the network and may cause denial 
of service [10]. 
A black hole attack is a kind of denial of 
service (DoS) where a malicious node can attract 
all packets by falsely claiming a fresh route to the 
destination and then absorb them (drop all packets) 
without forwarding them to the destination [11]. 
In reactive routing protocols such as AODV, 
the destination sequence number (dest_seq) is used 
to describe the freshness of the route. A higher 
value of dest_seq means a fresher route. On 
receiving a RREQ, an intruder can advertise itself 
as having the fresher route by sending a Route 
Reply (RREP) packet with a new dest_seq number 
larger than the current dest_seq number. In this 
way the intruder becomes part of the route to that 
destination [12]. Figure 1 illustrates the black hole 
attack where nodes S and D are the source and 
destination respectively and node B is the black 
hole. 
 
Figure 1: Black Hole Attack Illustration 
A black hole has two properties: First, the node 
exploits the ad hoc routing protocol to advertise 
itself as having a valid route to a destination, even 
though the route is spurious with the intention of 
intercepting packets. Second, the node consumes 
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the intercepted packets. In an ad hoc network that 
uses the AODV protocol, a black hole node 
absorbs the network traffic and drops all packets 
[11]. 
 
4. RELATED WORK 
 
Some research studies in the literature have 
focused on studying the effect of malicious nodes 
on network performance only without providing 
any solutions. However, several mechanisms and 
protocols using different strategies have been 
proposed to protect MANETs against black hole 
attacks. In [6] the authors studied the effect of 
malicious attacks in mobile ad hoc networks 
including black hole attack, packet drop attack and 
gray hole attack on AODV protocol under different 
performance metrics: throughput, packet drop rate 
and end-to-end delay. It was found that the black 
hole attack is more dangerous than other attacks 
conducted in this paper. 
Paper [13] provides a quantitative study of the 
performance impact of black hole attacks in ad hoc 
networks using DSR as the routing protocol. The 
authors used the following performance metrics to 
evaluate the impact of black hole attack on network 
performance: System Fairness, Number of hops for 
received packets, Total system throughput and 
Probability of interception. The simulation results 
of the impact of black hole node on system fairness 
showed that with no black hole node, the system 
has high fairness index. 
In [14], authors analyzed the effects of black 
hole attack in mobile ad hoc network using AODV 
and DSR routing protocols. For the simulation, 
throughput was considered as the main measure. 
Though the simulation results showed a higher data 
packet loss when using DSR as compared to 
AODV, the dropped packet rate was still high for 
both protocols. DSR data loss was around 55 - 60 
percent whereas that of AODV was around 45 - 50 
percent. AODV protocol provides better 
performance than the DSR in the presence of black 
holes with minimal additional delay and overhead. 
A black hole detection scheme for tactical 
MANETs using topology graph is proposed in[15]. 
This mechanism is called TOGBAD. It detects the 
attack using a topology graph, looking at the 
number of neighbors a node claims to have and the 
actual number of neighbors according to the graph. 
TOGBAD was developed for the OLSR proactive 
routing protocol, where topology information can 
be obtained. 
Authors of [16] proposed an approach that uses 
improved security mechanisms to be introduced in 
the proposed techniques so that it satisfies the main 
security requirement and guarantees the discovery 
of a correct and secure route. The security 
mechanisms that the protocol uses are the hash 
chain, digital signature and Protocol Enforcement 
Mechanism. The performance of these two 
protocols (SAODV and ARAN) was tested in 
simulation and their communication costs were 
measured using the ns-2 simulator, which is 
suitable for the present purpose. The evaluation 
metrics used in this study were overhead and end-
to-end delay. The results show good performance. 
In [17] a proposed method was introduced to 
find the secured routes and prevent the black hole 
nodes (malicious node) in the MANET by 
checking whether there is a large difference 
between the sequence number of source node or 
intermediate node that has sent back first RREP or 
not. Generally, the first route reply will be from the 
malicious node with high destination sequence 
number, which is stored as the first entry in the 
RR-Table. Then compare the first destination 
sequence number with the source node sequence 
number, if there exists much more differences 
between them, then it is surely from the malicious 
node, immediately remove that entry from the RR-
Table. The proposed method cannot find multiple 
black hole nodes. 
In [18] the authors proposed and implemented a 
new intrusion detection system named Enhanced 
Adaptive Acknowledgment (EAACK) specially 
designed for MANETs. Compared to modern 
approaches, EAACK demonstrates privileged 
malicious behavior detection rates in definite 
situations while it does not greatly affect the 
network performances. The demonstrated results 
show positive performances. 
A lightweight routing protocol IDSAODV was 
proposed in [19] as a solution for black hole attack 
problem in MANETs.  The authors of [19] 
manually analyzed the output file obtained from 
simulation and found out very soon after the first 
RREP from the destination node a second RREP 
arrived at the source node. Through simulation, 
they found out that the first RREP was from the 
black hole node and the second RREP was from 
the intended destination. At this point, for future 
simulations, they assumed that the first RREP 
would always be from black hole node and 
modified the AODV protocol to ignore the first 
RREP and send using second RREP route. A 
RREP caching mechanism to count the second 
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RREP message was added to aodv.cc file in ns-2 
simulator. 
The simulation results of [19] demonstrate that 
IDSAODV improved the PDR in a MANET with a 
single black hole node; thus, proving the successful 
implementation of the route caching mechanism. 
Many of the proposed solutions that make the 
route establishment process longer while the nodes 
are moving are facing from the link failure 
problem. In [5], the authors addressed this issue by 
getting advantage of the reverse AODV (RAODV) 
routing protocol proposed in [20]. RAODV 
discovers route using reverse route discovery 
procedure where the destination node sends 
reverse-route request (R-RREQ) messages to its 
neighbors to find a valid route to the source node 
after receiving RREQ from source node. Their 
simulation results of RAODV show that it does 
improve the performance of AODV in metrics such 
as packet delivery ratio (PDR), end-to-end delay, 
and energy consumption [20]. 
Although RAODV has not been designed to 
prevent black hole attacks and it was developed 
with the aim of solving path failure problem, 
authors of [5] proposed to use it in mitigating the 
effects of black hole attacks in ad hoc networks. 
So, they proposed RID-AODV by combining 
RAODV (proposed in [20]) and IDSAODV 
(proposed in [19]) to withstand multiple black hole 
attacks in client-based WMNs. 
 
5. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
The proposed protocol, "Enhanced RID-
AODV", is a modification and enhancement of the 
RID-AODV protocol proposed in [5]. That 
protocol is based on RAODV [20] and IDSAODV 
[19] as mentioned in the previous section. Our 
solution is to get advantage of the nature of the 
reverse route discovery procedure in RAODV. The 
detection of the malicious nodes and mitigation 
their effects can be achieved by creating and 
maintaining dynamic blacklist in each node 
according to some criteria. Then each non 
malicious node will prevent sending or forwarding 
to the neighboring nodes that exist in its own 
blacklist either in the forward or reverse path In 
other words, each node will not use blacklisted 
nodes as intermediate nodes. Dynamic blacklist 
means that each node adds and removes nodes to or 
from its blacklist automatically according to 
specific criteria as will be explained in this section. 
In addition, we can get another advantage of the 
nature of the reverse route discovery procedure in 
RAODV to create full path (bidirectional) integrity 
check implemented in hop-by-hop basis to detect 
any modifications on the traversing packets and to 
detect the causing nodes. 
The criteria for each node to add another node's 
address in its blacklist is the repetitive mismatch in 
the hash value of the receiving frames (layer 2 
frame) from the same neighboring node. So, each 
node keeps a counter for each other node that 
receives a frame from the neighboring nodes. If 
there is a mismatch between the received hash 
value and the calculated value, the corresponding 
counter for the sending (or forwarding) node will 
be incremented. When the counter reaches some 
threshold value 	
	, then the 
corresponding neighboring node will be 
blacklisted. 
If node  has  neighboring nodes ( is ⊆ of 
all nodes) and  is receiving from  nodes 
(		 ⊆ 		), then will keep only  counters 
for this purpose. For example, for the network in 
figure 2, the node 9 will maintain less than or equal 
to 5 counters. 
 
Figure 2: Each node maintains a small number of counters 
To distinguish between hash value mismatch 
that may occur as a result of normal link failure, 
which is from the nature of MANETs due to 
mobility of nodes that communicate wirelessly, or 
from the existence of malicious nodes, the 
threshold value 	
	 should be 
considered as a function of mobility (variable 
threshold). If the node is moving with relatively 
high speed the mismatch of hash values is most 
likely due to normal link failure, and so the 
threshold should be high. On the other hand, if 
there are many hash value mismatches while the 
node is moving slowly, there is most likely a 
malicious node. So, the value of 
	
	 is directly proportional to the 
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node speed and it was implemented by using 
equation (1): 
 
 	
	     (1) 
Where  is the threshold value when the node 
speed is zero. 
The malicious node may not act as a black hole 
all the time, it may become benign for some period 
of time, then it may (or may not) resume its 
malicious activities. So, when a node adds another 
node's address to its blacklist, the blacklisted node 
will not stay in its blacklist forever. However, it 
will be blacklisted for a previously specified period 
of time. So, when a node is added to another node's 
blacklist, not only the address of the blacklist is 
added but also the expiry time for that node to be 
released from that blacklist. The blacklisted node 
expiry time is computed using equation (2): 
   
 !!_#$	  %	
  
(2) 
Each time the node wants to send (or forward) a 
packet to a neighboring node, it will check if it is 
blacklisted, and if so it will also check the expiry 
time for that node. If it's expired, it will be 
removed from the blacklist of that node and its 
corresponding counter and expiry timer will be 
reset. Because of that it is dynamic blacklist. 
Now when a node wants to send (or forward) a 
packet, in either the forward path or reverse path, it 
will check the routing table to decide what is the 
next hop. Then it will check if the next hop is 
blacklisted or not, if it's blacklisted, it will check 
the blacklist expiry time. If the next hop node is 
still blacklisted, then the node will remove that 
node from its neighbor list and run the handle link 
failure procedure. Then the node will try to send 
(or forward) the packet by using another path. 
Figure 3 and figure 4 are pseudo codes for the 
proposed solution. Figure 3 describes how the node 
decides to add or remove other nodes to or from its 
blacklist, and figure 4 how the node behaves when 
sending or forwarding a packet. 
 
Pseudo code for the proposed solution: How the node 
decides to add or remove other nodes in its blacklist: 
1. Generate new hash value (&'	). 
2. Compare the generated hash value &_'	 
with the received hash value with the packet 
'	(. 
3. if(&'		 ) '	(* 
then,  
	+
,
-'.
* 
4. Check the speed of the node (). 
5. Compute the threshold that will be used to 
consider a node as blacklisted  
	
	     
6. //To add a node to a blacklist 
if,isBlacklisted,NextHop*  FALSE		&&	 
+
,'*
D 	
	* 
then, 
a. E,'*. 
b. ,'* 
 !!_#$	 
E%	
 
7. //To remove a node from a blacklist 
else if,isBlaklisted,NextHop*  TRUE		&& 
 !!_#$
D E,'** 
then, 
a. 
-E,'*. 
b. +
,'*  0 
c. ,'* 
	0 
//For other cases: keep the blacklist as it is 
Figure 3: Pseudo code for the proposed solution: How the node 
decides to add or remove other nodes in its blacklist 
 
 
Pseudo code for the proposed solution: How the node 
behaves when sending or forwarding a packet: 
1. if(isBlacklisted,NextHop*  TRUE* 
then, 
a. // Delete blacklisted node from neighbors 
list 
_,'*  
b. //Consider link with blacklisted node as 
link failure 
	__+
,'*  
Figure 4: Pseudo code for the proposed solution: how the node 
behaves when sending or forwarding a packet 
 
6. SIMULATION AND NETWORK 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
The simulation was carried out using ns-2 
simulator under Ubuntu Linux operating system. 
Ns-2 is a discrete-event simulator that is written in 
C++, which is object oriented language. During the 
simulation the packet header (aodv_packet.h file) 
of the AODV route request and route reply 
(changed to route reverse request) are modified to 
hold the hash value ('	_() with packet. In 
addition to that, the files aodv.h and aodv.cc were 
modified to implement the proposed solution 
together with previous protocols. Simulation was 
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done by referring to many resources including but 
not limited to [21][22][23]. 
The simulation area is a square field of 1000m 
x 1000m with fixed sender and receiver nodes that 
communicate using intermediate mobile nodes, 
which are moving randomly during simulation time 
(these random movements were generated using 
'setdest' tool) and are sending random traffic 
pattern among each other (created using 'cbrgen.tcl' 
command). The sender and receiver were placed in 
points (200,200) and (800,800) respectively. The 
parameter considered in this simulation is given in 
table 2 below. 
TABLE2: PARAMETERS USED IN NS-2 SIMULATION 
Parameter Value 
Simulator ns-2 
Routing protocol AODV, IDSAODV, R-
AODV, RID-AODV, 
Enhanced RID-AODV 
Simulation time 100 sec 
Simulation area 1000m x 1000m 
Number of nodes 40 
Number of malicious 
nodes 
0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
Sender node Fixed at point (200,200) 
Receiver node Fixed at point (800,800) 
Intermediate nodes Moving randomly 
Maximum speed of 
mobile nodes 
20 m/s 
Data Rate 50 Kb/s 
Pause time 0 sec 
Transport type UDP, CBR 
Data packet size Default 
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11 
 
In this research, the proposed solution together 
with four preceding protocols were implemented 
and simulated with the same environment 
parameters to be able to make a comparison among 
them. That include: the genuine AODV protocol 
with simulation of black hole malicious nodes, the 
IDSAODV protocol proposed in [19], RAODV 
proposed in [20], RID-AODV that was proposed 
on [5] and our proposed solution in this paper 
which is Enhanced RID-AODV. For each protocol 
many scenarios were generated to simulate the 
existence of different number of malicious nodes in 
order to study the effect of multiple malicious 
nodes on network performance and the 
effectiveness of each solution to compare among 
these solutions; we made as many combinations of 
nodes to act as malicious nodes and then we 
computed the average of the results. 
 
Performance Metrics: 
In this simulation, the following three 
performance metrics were considered and 
computed as the average of many cases in all 
scenarios of multiple malicious nodes for all the 
protocols in the study. Three separate scripts were 
generated to compute these performance metrics 
using awk command. 
• Throughput: The amount of data 
transferred over the period of time 
expressed in kilobits per second (kbps). 
Throughput has been calculated using 
equation (3): 
	
+%	+

∑K		!-	L	
+	
 
(3) 
• Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): The 
percentage ratio of the total number of data 
packets received by the destination node to 
the number of data packets sent by the 
source node as in equation (4). 
L! 
∑+
		!-	L	
∑+
			L	
∗ 100% 
(4) 
• Average End-to-End Delay: The average 
delay between the sending of the data 
packet by the source node and its receipt at 
the destination node. This includes all the 
delays caused during route acquisition, 
buffering and processing at intermediate 
nodes, retransmission delays at the MAC 
layer… etc. The average end-to-end delay 
was computed using equation (5). 
.-%_2_LQ		= 
∑ ,!-			 R 				*
+
		!-	
 
(5) 
 
7. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Simulation results show that only one black 
hole in the network - without any solution - is able 
to decrease the PDR to almost 10% of its value 
without black hole. And only a small number of 
black holes in the network are able to reduce the 
throughput and the packet delivery ratio to almost 
zero resulting in denial of service (DoS) for the 
legitimate nodes, as illustrated in figure 5 and 
figure 6 respectively. 
These two figures also show the results of 
applying four solutions: IDSAODV, R-AODV, 
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RID-AODV and the proposed Enhanced RID-
AODV on increasing the throughput and the packet 
delivery ratio. It's obvious that the proposed 
protocol "Enhanced RID-AODV" has the highest 
throughput and the packet delivery ratio. That 
happens because of the effect of applying the 
dynamic blacklists with variable threshold resulting 
in reducing the packet loss due to malicious nodes. 
 
Figure 5: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Throughput 
for different protocols in mitigating multiple black hole attacks 
 
 
Figure 6: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Packet 
Delivery Ratio for different protocols in mitigating multiple 
black hole attacks 
Another major improvement as a result of 
applying the proposed protocol is decreasing the 
average end-to-end delay; that because of the effect 
of the dynamic blacklists in forwarding packets to 
only the non malicious intermediate nodes to create 
right paths and to avoid the malicious nodes in both 
the forward and reverse paths. This is clear in 
figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Average End-
to-End Delay for different protocols in mitigating multiple black 
hole attacks 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper a new mechanism, called 
"Enhanced RID-AODV", was proposed to detect 
and mitigate the effects of multiple black hole 
attacks in MANETs. It is an enhanced and 
modified version of a previously proposed 
mechanism called RID-AODV. RID-AODV is a 
combination of reverse routing and route caching 
technique. The proposed idea in this paper is 
creating a dynamic blacklist in each node, then 
prevent sending or forwarding to blacklisted nodes 
in both directions for a pre-specified period of 
time. The criteria to add a node in the blacklist is 
reaching a threshold in the number of mismatched 
hashing value from that node. The threshold is a 
function of mobility (variable threshold) to cancel 
the effect of normal link failure which is most 
likely caused by nodes mobility. According to the 
simulation results, Enhanced RID-AODV provides 
higher throughput and higher packet delivery ratio 
than its preceding version. Also, the dynamic 
blacklists provide positive effects in decreasing the 
end-to-end delay. 
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 
Abstract—Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) form a 
promising approach for applications that need fast installation 
with no infrastructure especially in disaster recovery and 
emergency operations. However, many challenges are facing 
MANETs including security, routing, transmission range and 
dynamically changing topology with high nodes mobility. 
Security is considered as the main obstacle for the widespread 
adoption of MANET applications. Black hole attack is a type of 
DoS attack that can disrupt the services of the network layer. It 
has the worst malicious impact on network performance as the 
number of malicious nodes increases. Several mechanisms and 
protocols have been proposed to detect and mitigate its effects 
using different strategies. However, many of these solutions 
impose more overhead and increase the average end-to-end 
delay. This paper proposes an enhanced and modified 
mechanism called "Enhanced RID-AODV", based on a 
preceding mechanism: RID-AODV. The proposed 
enhancement is based on creating dynamic blacklists for each 
node in the network. Each node, according to criteria depends 
on the number of mismatches of hash values of received packets 
as compared with some threshold values, can decide to add or 
remove other nodes to or from its blacklist. The threshold is a 
function of mobility (variable threshold) to cancel the effect of 
normal link failure. Enhanced RID-AODV was implemented in 
ns-2 simulator and compared with three previous solutions for 
mitigating multiple black hole attacks in terms of performance 
metrics. The results show an increase in throughput and packet 
delivery ratio and a decrease in end-to-end delay and overhead 
ratio. 
 
Index Terms—Enhanced RID-AODV, MANET security, 
multiple black hole attacks, network layer attack. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a self-configuring 
network formed by co-operating and independent nodes that 
connect and communicate with each other wirelessly without 
pre-existing infrastructure. If two mobile nodes are within 
each other transmission range, then they can communicate 
with each other directly; otherwise, the nodes in between 
have to forward the packet for them. So, mobile nodes are not 
only functioning as hosts but they are also function as 
routers ‎[1]. 
Because MANETs are infrastructure-less networks with 
no centralized administration, they can be self deployed in 
short time. The easy deployment of nodes, self-organizing 
nature and freedom of mobility make MANETs suitable for a 
broad range of applications. They can be useful in disaster 
recovery and emergency operations where there is not 
enough time or resources to install and configure an 
infrastructure. They are also used in other applications; for 
 
 
example, in military services, maritime communications, 
vehicle networks, casual meetings, campus networks, robot 
networks… etc ‎[2]. 
On the other hand, MANETs are vulnerable to various 
attacks at all layers. So, much research has been conducted on 
providing security services for MANETs, because security is 
the main obstacle for the widespread adoption of MANET 
applications. MANETs are vulnerable in their functionality: 
intruders can compromise the operation of the network by 
attacking at any of the physical, MAC or network layers. The 
network layer, especially the routing protocol, is vulnerable 
because of the use of cooperative routing algorithms, the 
limited computational ability of nodes, the exhaustible node 
batteries, the lack of clearly defined physical network 
boundary and the transient nature of services in the network. 
Standard information security measures such as encryption 
and authentication do not provide complete protection; thus 
intrusion detection and prevention (IDP) mechanisms are 
widely used to secure MANETs ‎[3]. 
Attacks in MANET can be divided, according to the 
criteria that whether they disrupt the operation of a routing 
protocol or not, into two classes: passive attacks and active 
attacks. In passive attacks, the attacker attempts to discover 
valuable information but does not disrupt the operation of the 
routing protocol. Active attacks; however, involve actions 
like modification and deletion of exchanging data to absorb 
packets destined to other nodes to the attacker for analyzing 
or disabling the network. Some typical kinds of active attacks 
that can be performed against MANETs are: black hole 
attack, gray hole attack, flooding attack, selfish attack, 
rushing attack, spoofing, wormhole attack, sleep deprivation 
and impersonation ‎[4]. 
Black hole attack is a type of active attack that exploits the 
route reply message (RREP) feature of the ad hoc on-demand 
distance vector (AODV) routing protocol. This attack 
involves some modification of the data stream or the creation 
of a false stream. A malicious node sends RREP messages 
without checking its routing table for a fresh route to a 
destination. A RREP message from a malicious node is the 
first to arrive at a source node. Hence, a source node updates 
its routing table for the new route to the particular destination 
node and discards any other RREP messages from other 
neighboring nodes or even from the actual destination node. 
Once a source node saves a route, it starts sending buffered 
data packets to a malicious node hoping they will be 
forwarded to a destination node. Nevertheless, a malicious 
node (performing a black hole attack) drops all data packets 
rather than forwarding them ‎[5]. 
So, the black hole attack is a DoS attack that disrupts the 
services of routing layer by exploiting the route discovery 
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process of AODV. According to many research studies that 
focus on studying the effects of malicious attacks on network 
performance, the simulation results show that the black hole 
attack is more dangerous than other attacks in the network 
layer ‎[6]. 
Several mechanisms and protocols have been proposed to 
detect and mitigate its effect using different strategies. 
However, many of these solutions impose more overhead and 
increase the average end-to-end delay. 
In this paper, we propose a modified and enhanced 
protocol that aims to detect and mitigate the effects of 
multiple black hole attacks in MANETs. The proposed 
solution, "Enhanced RID-AODV", was implemented in ns-2 
simulator and compared with three previous solutions for 
mitigating multiple black hole attacks in terms of 
performance metrics. The results show an increase in 
throughput and packet delivery ratio and a decrease in 
end-to-end delay and overhead ratio. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section II 
provides some details about the black hole attack, section III 
provides the related work in detection and mitigation of black 
hole attack. The proposed solution is introduced in section 
IV, the simulation and network environment is described in 
section V, in section VI, the analysis and the results are 
discussed. Finally, the conclusion is presented in section VII. 
 
II. BLACK HOLE ATTACK IN MANETS 
Routing protocols in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks by their 
nature are distributed routing protocols with the assumption 
that all nodes in the network will cooperate truly and 
participate honestly. However, the existence of malicious 
nodes makes this assumption not true. Such nodes may drop 
the packets, if they are not the destination, without 
forwarding them or may disrupt the routing discovery and 
maintenance processes resulting in abnormal network 
operation that affects the performance of the network and 
may cause denial of service ‎[7]. 
A black hole attack is a kind of denial of service where a 
malicious node can attract all packets by falsely claiming a 
fresh route to the destination and then absorb them (drop all 
packets) without forwarding them to the destination ‎[8]. 
In reactive routing protocols such as AODV, the 
destination sequence number (dest_seq) is used to describe 
the freshness of the route. A higher value of dest_seq means a 
fresher route. On receiving a RREQ, an intruder can advertise 
itself as having the fresher route by sending a Route Reply 
(RREP) packet with a new dest_seq number larger than the 
current dest_seq number. In this way the intruder becomes 
part of the route to that destination ‎[9]. Fig. 1 illustrates the 
black hole attack where nodes S and D are the source and 
destination respectively and node B is the black hole. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Black Hole Attack Illustration 
 
A black hole has two properties: First, the node exploits 
the ad hoc routing protocol to advertise itself as having a 
valid route to a destination, even though the route is spurious 
with the intention of intercepting packets. Second, the node 
consumes the intercepted packets. In an ad hoc network that 
uses the AODV protocol, a black hole node absorbs the 
network traffic and drops all packets ‎[8]. 
III. RELATED WORK 
Some research studies in the literature have focused on 
studying the effect of malicious nodes on network 
performance only without providing any solutions. However, 
several mechanisms and protocols using different strategies 
have been proposed to protect MANETs against black hole 
attacks. In ‎[6] the authors studied the effect of malicious 
attacks in mobile ad hoc networks including black hole 
attack, packet drop attack and gray hole attack on AODV 
protocol under different performance metrics: throughput, 
packet drop rate and end-to-end delay. It was found that the 
black hole attack is more dangerous than other attacks 
conducted in this paper. 
Paper ‎[10] provides a quantitative study of the 
performance impact of black hole attacks in ad hoc networks 
using DSR as the routing protocol. The authors used the 
following performance metrics to evaluate the impact of 
black hole attack on network performance: System Fairness, 
Number of hops for received packets, Total system 
throughput and Probability of interception. The simulation 
results of the impact of black hole node on system fairness 
showed that with no black hole node, the system has high 
fairness index. 
In ‎[11] authors analyzed the effects of black hole attack in 
mobile ad hoc network using AODV and DSR routing 
protocols. For the simulation, throughput was considered as 
the main measure. Though the simulation results showed a 
higher data packet loss when using DSR compared to AODV, 
the dropped packet rate was still high for both protocols. DSR 
data loss was around 55 - 60 percent whereas that of AODV 
was around 45 - 50 percent. AODV protocol provides better 
performance than the DSR in the presence of black holes with 
minimal additional delay and overhead. 
A black hole detection scheme for tactical MANETs using 
topology graph is proposed in ‎[12]. This mechanism is called 
TOGBAD. It detects the attack using a topology graph, 
looking at the number of neighbors a node claims to have and 
the actual number of neighbors according to the graph. 
TOGBAD was developed for the OLSR proactive routing 
protocol, where topology information can be obtained. 
  
 
Authors of ‎[13] proposed an approach that uses improved 
security mechanisms to be introduced in the proposed 
techniques so that it satisfies the main security requirement 
and guarantees the discovery of a correct and secure route. 
The security mechanisms that the protocol uses are the hash 
chain, digital signature and Protocol Enforcement 
Mechanism. The performance of these two protocols 
(SAODV and ARAN) was tested in simulation and their 
communication costs were measured using the NS-2 
simulator, which is suitable for the present purpose. The 
evaluation metrics used in this study were overhead and 
end-to-end delay. The results show good performance. 
In ‎[14] a proposed method was introduced to find the 
secured routes and prevent the black hole nodes (malicious 
node) in the MANET by checking whether there is a large 
difference between the sequence number of source node or 
intermediate node that has sent back first RREP or not. 
Generally, the first route reply will be from the malicious 
node with high destination sequence number, which is stored 
as the first entry in the RR-Table. Then compare the first 
destination sequence number with the source node sequence 
number, if there exists much more differences between them, 
then it is surely from the malicious node, immediately 
remove that entry from the RR-Table. The proposed method 
cannot find multiple black hole nodes. 
In ‎[15] the authors proposed and implemented a new 
intrusion detection system named Enhanced Adaptive 
Acknowledgment (EAACK) specially designed for 
MANETs. Compared to modern approaches, EAACK 
demonstrates privileged malicious behavior detection rates in 
definite situations while it does not greatly affect the network 
performances. The demonstrated results show positive 
performances. 
A lightweight routing protocol IDSAODV was proposed 
in ‎[16] as a solution for black hole attack problem in 
MANETs.  The authors of ‎[16] manually analyzed the output 
file obtained from simulation and found out very soon after 
the first RREP from the destination node a second RREP 
arrived at the source node. Through simulation, they found 
out that the first RREP was from the black hole node and the 
second RREP was from the intended destination. At this 
point, for future simulations, they assumed that the first 
RREP would always be from black hole node and modified 
the AODV protocol to ignore the first RREP and send using 
second RREP route. A RREP caching mechanism to count 
the second RREP message was added to aodv.cc file in NS-2. 
The simulation results of ‎[16] demonstrate that IDSAODV 
improved the PDR in a MANET with a single black hole 
node; thus, proving the successful implementation of the 
route caching mechanism. 
Many of the proposed solutions that make the route 
establishment process longer while the nodes are moving are 
facing from the link failure problem. In ‎[5], the authors 
addressed this issue by getting advantage of the reverse 
AODV (RAODV) routing protocol proposed in ‎[17]. 
RAODV discovers route using reverse route discovery 
procedure where the destination node sends reverse-route 
request (R-RREQ) messages to its neighbors to find a valid 
route to the source node after receiving RREQ from source 
node. Their simulation results of RAODV show that it does 
improve the performance of AODV in metrics such as packet 
delivery ratio (PDR), end-to-end delay, and energy 
consumption ‎[17]. 
Although RAODV has not been designed to prevent black 
hole attacks and it was developed with the aim of solving 
path failure problem, authors of ‎[5] proposed to use it in 
mitigating the effects of black hole attacks in ad hoc 
networks. So, they proposed RID-AODV by combining 
RAODV and IDSAODV (proposed in ‎[16]) to withstand 
multiple black hole attacks in client-based WMNs. 
 
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The proposed solution, "Enhanced RID-AODV", is a 
modification and enhancement of the RID-AODV protocol 
proposed in ‎[5]. That protocol is based on RAODV ‎[17] and 
IDSAODV ‎[16] as mentioned in the previous section. Our 
solution is to get advantage of the nature of the reverse route 
discovery procedure in RAODV. The detection of the 
malicious nodes and mitigation their effects can be achieved 
by creating and maintaining dynamic blacklist in each node 
according to some criteria. Then each non malicious node 
will prevent sending or forwarding to the neighboring nodes 
that exist in its own blacklist either in the forward or reverse 
path (In other words, each node will not use blacklisted nodes 
as intermediate nodes). Dynamic blacklist means that each 
node adds and removes nodes to or from its blacklist 
automatically according to specific criteria as will be 
explained in this section. 
In addition, we can get another advantage of the nature of 
the reverse route discovery procedure in RAODV to create 
full path (bidirectional) integrity check implemented in 
hop-by-hop basis to detect any modifications on the 
traversing packets and to detect the causing nodes. 
The criteria for each node to add another node's address in 
its blacklist is the repetitive mismatch in the hash value of the 
receiving frames (layer 2 frame) from the same neighboring 
node. So, each node keeps a counter for each other node that 
receives a frame from the neighboring nodes. If there is a 
mismatch between the received hash value and the calculated 
value, the corresponding counter for the sending (or 
forwarding) node will be incremented. When the counter 
reaches some threshold value                 , then the 
corresponding neighboring node will be blacklisted. 
If node    has   neighboring nodes (  is ⊆ of all nodes) 
and    is receiving from   nodes (     ⊆      ), then   will 
keep only   counters for this purpose. 
To distinguish between hash value mismatch that may 
occur as a result of normal link failure, which is from the 
nature of MANETs due to mobility of nodes that 
communicate wirelessly, or from the existence of malicious 
nodes, the threshold value                  should be 
considered as a function of mobility (variable threshold). If 
the node is moving with relatively high speed the mismatch 
of hash values is most likely due to normal link failure, and so 
the threshold should be high. On the other hand, if there are 
many hash value mismatches while the node is moving 
slowly, there is most likely a malicious node. So, the value of 
                 is directly proportional to the node 
speed and it was implemented by using equation (1): 
 
  
 
 malPcktThreshold NodeSpeed C   (1) 
 
Where   is some constant value. 
When a node adds another node address to its blacklist, the 
blacklisted node will not stay in its blacklist forever. 
However, it will be blacklisted for a previously specified 
period of time. So, when a node is added to another node's 
blacklist, not only the address of the blacklist is added but 
also the expiry time for that node to be released from that 
blacklist. The blacklisted node expiry time is computed using 
equation (2): 
 
_
blkListedExpTime
CURRENT TIME blockingPeriod


 (2) 
 
Each time the node wants to send (or forward) a packet to a 
neighboring node, it will check if it is blacklisted, and if so it 
will also check the expiry time for that node. If it's expired, it 
will be removed from the blacklist of that node and its 
corresponding counter and expiry timer will be reset. 
Because of that it is dynamic blacklist. 
Now, when a node wants to send (or forward) a packet, in 
either the forward path or reverse path, it will check the 
routing table to decide what is the next hop. Then it will 
check if the next hop is blacklisted or not, if it's blacklisted, it 
will check the black list expiry time. If the next hop node is 
still blacklisted, then the node will remove that node from its 
neighbor list and run the handle link failure procedure. Then 
the node will try to send (or forward) the packet by using 
another path. 
 
Pseudo code for the proposed solution – how the node 
decides to add or remove other nodes in its blacklist: 
1. Generate new hash value (       ). 
2. Compare the generated hash value          with the 
received hash value with the packet        . 
3. if(                  
then,                                 
4. Check the speed of the node (         ). 
5. Compute the threshold that will be used to consider a node 
as blacklisted  
                             
6. //To add a node to a blacklist 
if                                   
                                         
then, 
a.                      . 
b.                               
                              
7. //To remove a node from a blacklist 
else if                                
            
                                
then, 
a.                         . 
b.                          
c.                              
//For other cases: keep the blacklist as it is 
 
Pseudo code for the proposed solution when sending or 
forwarding a packet (in both directions forward and 
reverse): 
if(                              
then, 
a. // Delete blacklisted node from neighbors list 
                    
b. //Consider link with blacklisted node as link failure 
                              
 
V. SIMULATION AND NETWORK ENVIRONMENT 
 
The simulation was carried out using ns-2 simulator under 
Ubuntu Linux operating system. Ns-2 is a discrete-event 
simulator that is written in C++, which is object oriented 
language. During the simulation the packet header 
(aodv_packet.h file) of the AODV route request and route 
reply (changed to route reverse request) are modified to hold 
the hash value (        ) with packet. In addition to that, 
the files aodv.h and aodv.cc were modified to implement the 
proposed solution together with previous protocols. 
Simulation was done by referring to many resources 
including but not limited to ‎[18]‎[19]‎[20]. 
The simulation area is a square field of 1000m x 1000m 
with fixed sender and receiver nodes that communicate using 
intermediate mobile nodes, which are moving randomly 
during simulation time (these random movements were 
generated using 'setdest' tool) and are sending random traffic 
pattern among each other (created using 'cbrgen.tcl' 
command). The sender and receiver were placed in points 
(200,200) and (800,800) respectively. The parameter 
considered in this simulation is given in table 1 below. 
 
TABLE1: PARAMETERS USED IN NS-2 SIMULATION 
Parameter Value 
Simulator ns-2 
Routing protocol AODV, IDSAODV, R-AODV, 
RID-AODV, Enhanced RID-AODV 
Simulation time 100 sec 
Simulation area 1000m x 1000m 
Number of nodes 40 
Number of malicious nodes 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
Sender node Fixed at point (200,200) 
Receiver node Fixed at point (800,800) 
Intermediate nodes Moving randomly 
Maximum speed of mobile 
nodes 
20 m/s 
Data Rate 50 Kb/s 
Pause time 0 sec 
Transport type UDP, CBR 
Data packet size Default 
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11 
 
In this research, the proposed solution together with four 
preceding protocols were implemented and simulated with 
the same environment parameters to be able to make a 
comparison among them. That include: the genuine AODV 
protocol with simulation of black hole malicious nodes, the 
IDSAODV protocol proposed in ‎[16], RAODV proposed 
in ‎[17], RID-AODV that was proposed on ‎[5] and our 
proposed solution in this paper which is Enhanced 
  
 
RID-AODV. For each protocol many scenarios were 
generated to simulate the existence of different number of 
malicious nodes in order to study the effect of multiple 
malicious nodes on network performance and the 
effectiveness of each solution to compare among these 
solutions; we made as many combinations of nodes to act as 
malicious nodes and then we computed the average of the 
results. 
 
Performance Metrics 
In this simulation, the following four performance metrics 
were considered and computed as the average of many cases 
in all scenarios of multiple malicious nodes for all the 
protocols in the study. Four separate scripts were generated to 
compute these performance metrics using awk command. 
 Throughput: The amount of data transferred over the 
period of time expressed in kilobits per second (kbps). 
Throughput has been calculated using formula (3): 
ReceiveDataPacketsSize
Throughput
SimulationTime


 (3) 
 
 Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): The percentage ratio 
of the total number of data packets received by the 
destination node to the number of data packets sent by 
the source node as in equation (4). 
 
Re
100%
Numberof ceivedDataPackets
PDR
NumberofSentDataPackets
 


 
(4) 
 
 Average End-to-End Delay ( E EAvgDelay  ): The 
average delay between the sending of the data packet 
by the source node and its receipt at the destination 
node. This includes all the delays caused during route 
acquisition, buffering and processing at intermediate 
nodes, retransmission delays at the MAC layer, etc. 
The average end-to-end delay was computed using 
equation (5). 
(Re )
Re
i i
i
E E
ceiveTime of P SentTimeof P
AvgDelay
Numberof ceivedPackets




 (5) 
 
 Overhead Ratio (OH): The ratio of the total number 
of control packets sent at the routing level and the 
total number of packets sent from the source node as 
in equation (6). 
1
NumberofSentDataPcktsAtRTR
OH
NumberofAllPcktsAtRTR
   (6) 
 
 
 
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Simulation results show that only one black hole in the 
network - without any solution - is able to decrease the PDR 
to almost 10% of its value without black hole. And only a 
small number of black holes in the network are able to reduce 
the throughput and the packet delivery ratio to almost zero 
resulting in denial of service (DoS) for the legitimate nodes, 
as illustrated in fig. 2 and 3 respectively. 
These two figures also show the results of applying four 
solutions: IDSAODV, R-AODV, RID-AODV and the 
proposed Enhanced RID-AODV on increasing the 
throughput and the packet delivery ratio. It's obvious that the 
proposed protocol "Enhanced RID-AODV" has the highest 
throughput and the packet delivery ratio. That happens 
because of the effect of applying the dynamic blacklists with 
variable threshold resulting in reducing the packet loss due to 
malicious nodes. 
 
Fig. 2: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Throughput for different 
protocols in mitigating multiple black hole attacks 
 
 
Fig. 3: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Packet Delivery Ratio for 
different protocols in mitigating multiple black hole attacks 
 
Another major improvement as a result of applying the 
proposed protocol is decreasing the average end-to-end delay 
and the overhead; that because of the effect of the dynamic 
blacklists in forwarding packets to only the non malicious 
intermediate nodes to create right paths and to avoid the 
malicious nodes in both the forward and reverse paths. This is 
clear in fig. 4 and fig. 5. 
  
 
 
Fig. 4: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Average End-to-End Delay 
for different protocols in mitigating multiple black hole attacks 
 
 
Fig. 5: Effect of number of malicious nodes on Overhead for different 
protocols in mitigating multiple black hole attacks. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Several mechanisms and protocols have been proposed to 
detect and mitigate the effects of multiple black hole attack 
using different strategies. However, many of these solutions 
impose more overhead and increase the average end-to-end 
delay. In this paper a new mechanism, called "Enhanced 
RID-AODV", was proposed to detect and mitigate the effects 
of multiple black hole attacks in MANETs aiming to increase 
the throughput and PDR while decreasing the the average 
end-to-end delay and overhead. It is an enhanced and 
modified version of a previously proposed mechanism called 
RID-AODV. RID-AODV is a combination of two other 
protocols: RAODV (reverse routing) and IDSAODV which 
is based on creating route caching technique. 
The proposed idea in this paper is creating a dynamic 
blacklist in each node, then prevent sending or forwarding to 
blacklisted nodes in both directions for a pre-specified period 
of time. The criteria to add a node in the blacklist is reaching 
a threshold in the number of mismatched hashing value from 
that node. The threshold is a function of mobility (variable 
threshold) to cancel the effect of normal link failure which is 
most likely caused by nodes mobility. 
According to the simulation results, Enhanced 
RID-AODV provides higher throughput and higher packet 
delivery ratio than its preceding version. Also, the dynamic 
blacklists provide positive effects in decreasing the overhead 
ratio and the end-to-end delay. 
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